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“What is our life? A game!”
P.I.Tchaikovsky, opera ”Queen of Spades”

Acknowledgements
In this chapter I would like to thank all those who helped me during these five years.
Without you I would never be able to do it.
Most importantly, I want to thank my supervisors, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Pierro
Gottardi. It was a great journey during which I’ve learned a lot. I am grateful for your
patience, for encouragement, for challenge, for trust. I want to thank you for all the
valuable advice, for teaching how to ask questions and what’s the best way to tackle
them. I also want to thank Prof. Levine, Prof. Matozzi, Prof. Morelli, Prof. Rahman,
Prof. Sutter for devoting your time when I came for your opinion. I wish I had more
opportunities to discuss research with you.
I want also to thank Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for giving me this opportunity
to do my PhD. Four yours I’ve spent in Italy and EUI were absolutely amazing. I am
extremely grateful for this experience.
I especially want to thank Svetlana Pivovarova and Larisa Korableva for your help on
my research. Hours, days and nights I’ve spent talking to you, guys, discussing ideas
and models are priceless. I hope our research paths will continue to go together.
At this point I would also like to thank Arevik Mkrtchan, Hinnerk Gnutzman, Piotrek
Spiewanoski, Kenan Huremovic, Ilya Archakov, Anastasya Antsygina and all partici-
pants of Network and Game Theory Working Group. Thank you folks for always being
there for me both personally and research-wise.
I especially want to thank my coauthor, colleague, ex-flatmate, and dear friend Chara
Papioti. I am so happy our roads crossed several times. Chara, without you this last
year would be so much harder (as if it was not already tough enough). I hope our
collaboration and friendship will continue despite all the kilometers that lie between us
now.
Dear Jessica Spataro, Lucia Vigna, Marcia Gastaldo, Francoise Thauvin, Thomas Bourke,
I want to thank you so much for your amazing work! I appreciate the way you made
our life much easier.
I can not even try to name all my colleagues and friends from EUI who supported me
during this way. Thank you all guys so much!
I am also grateful to ESC-Rennes school of business in France that gave me job for my
fifth year of PhD. As economists we know that everything comes at a cost and there’s
no free lunch. I am grateful for experience you gave me, thought it came at the expense
of my research work.
iii
I also want to thank my mom. I know she worries a lot about all my undertakings. She
was very helpful when sometimes I felt lost on the track. I know she’s very proud of me
and I hope to meet her expectations.
Finally, I am eternally grateful to my husband. His support was absolutely outstanding.
He was always there for me in the minutes of doubt, helped me with some proofs, and
constantly believed in me. This was a great journey for both of us and I am absolutely
sure I would not be able to do it without him.
        Abstract 
 
My thesis covers different aspects of applied game theory.  
The first paper looks at a two-sided asymmetric information game where agents 
make a collaborative decision not knowing each other’s types. In the model, an 
intermediary has full knowledge about the types of agents and can make a decision 
that brings information to some types. However, once he puts the information on 
the table the agents are not obliged to pay him, which undermines his incentive to 
participate in the first place. I find that, nevertheless, the intermediary is still 
welfare-improving. 
 
In my second chapter I search for the optimal prize schemes in contests with 
sabotage. In the presence of sabotage, a standard prize scheme where the entire 
prize is given to the winner is no longer optimal as it creates very high incentives 
for sabotage. I show that in that case, an optimal prize structure may also assume a 
positive reward for contestants that are behind. With a higher number of 
contestants sabotage becomes a public good and therefore it is a lesser concern for 
the designer. In that case, when sabotage is expensive, the designer can achieve the 
first best by giving the whole sum to the winner. When I extend the problem to the 
continuous case the solution crucially depends on the cost of sabotage. When 
sabotage is expensive, the principal wants to give all of the prize to the winner, 
while when it is cheap he does not want to make a contest at all, and distributes all 
prizes equally.  
 
In the third paper we analyze to what extent knowing game theory alters a persons' 
behavior. Our experiment showed a huge difference in results before and after the 
course. However results suggest that players behave less cooperatively not because 
of the knowledge of game theory per se, but due to changed expectations. We have 
also found that a course on game theory increases the level of reasoning.  
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis covers different aspects of applied game theory. Two papers have in com-
mon the game-theoretical approach to model a real-life phenomenon. The third paper
questions the influence game theory itself have on students performance and attitude in
a classroom experiment.
The first paper Informed Middlemen and Asymmetric Information looks at two-sided
asymmetric information game where agents make a collaborative decision not knowing
types of each other. This structure describes the market for booking agents (interme-
diaries between bands and promoters), and generally for talent agents. In the model
an intermediary has full knowledge about the types of agents and can make a decision
that brings information to some types. However, once he puts the information on the
table agents are not obliged to pay him, which undermines his incentive to participate
in the first place. To obtain my results I develop the concept of PBE stable to bilateral
deviations. I find that, nevertheless, the intermediary is still welfare-improving and re-
stores efficiency. He either brings information to the most vulnerable type or to nobody.
The situation is drastically different when I look at two informed intermediaries that
compete in prices. In this case there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Nonexistence
in this sense is similar to that of screening models, although standard ways of dealing
with it (e.g. reactive equilibrium concept) do not work here. Once the competition
between intermediaries increases sufficiently, equilibrium reoccurs. In this equilibrium
there is partial specialization between intermediaries - every pair of intermediaries sets
a different wage and concentrates on a particular match.
In my second paper Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests with Sabotage I search for
the optimal prize schemes in contests with sabotage. Contests are powerful mechanisms
to induce the right incentives from the agents. In a contest with multiple participants
particular prize distribution can allow a principal to maximize the expected effort he can
1
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get. In literature it is shown that if principal allocates positive prizes it is optimal to give
all the sum to the leader. However, in real-life we see various contests that have multiple
prizes. I consider possibility of sabotage in contests as a possible explanation. Under the
presence of sabotage standard prize scheme is no longer optimal as it creates very high
incentives to sabotage. I show that in that case optimal prize structure may also assume
positive rewards for contestants that are behind. This result always holds in the case of
two contestants. With higher number of contestants I differentiate between two sabotage
protocols. With individual protocol sabotage becomes a public good and therefore it
is a lesser concern for designer. In that case when sabotage is expensive designer can
achieve the first best by giving the whole sum to the winner. Then I extend the model
to continuous case. Here, the solution crucially depends on the cost of sabotage. When
sabotage is expensive, principal wants to give all prize to the winner, while when it is
cheap it does not want to make a contest at all, and distributes all prizes equally. This
result explains one of the reasons why companies like Microsoft have given up ”forced
ranking” schemes.
My third paper Teaching to be Selfish: Classroom Experiment on Prisoners Dilemma
is a join work with Chara Papioti. We have written this work during the year we have
spent teaching at ESC-Rennes, France. In our paper we analyze to what extent knowing
game theory alternates persons’ behavior. We have conducted classroom experiments
on Prisoners Dilemma during the course on Microeconomics that we were teaching. To
identify the source of changed behavior we have conducted different treatments. Our
experiment showed that indeed there is a huge difference in results before and after the
course. However results suggest that players behave less cooperatively not because of
the knowledge of game theory per se, but due to the change in expectations. We’ve
also found that course on game theory increases the level of reasoning. Our last result
also shows gender differences in expectations after the course. While female participants
were expecting their partner to defect, males expected only cooperation.
Chapter 2
Informed middleman and
asymmetric information
I.Kirysheva1
1irina.kirysheva@nu.edu.kz
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2.1 Introduction
Economic literature long has been interested in the problems that include the presence
of a third party in the transaction. This research applies to trade, flows of goods in
networks, referrals in the job market and much more. However, despite the vast coverage,
little has been said on the role of an intermediary as a bridge to overcome asymmetric
information.
There are situations when a third party possesses information that is valuable for other
agents. For example, a football agent has good knowledge both about the ability of
potential players and the perspectives of different teams; booking agents (intermediaries
between musicians and performance promoters) know both the potentials of the band
and the peculiarities of different promoters. At the same time, players themselves cannot
acquire this information or it might be extremely costly, and absence of information
leads to inefficiencies. In this case the informed third party might have an incentive to
participate in the ongoing transaction and eventually reveal some part of his knowledge.
Obviously, an intermediary would like to use his informational advantage in the most
valuable way. The paradox is that once he takes an action that brings something new to
the agent the latter might use the already revealed information on his own and decide
not pay to the intermediary in order to economize. This in turn changes the incentives
of an intermediary to participate in the first place.
My main question in this setting is whether, given the above, the intermediary can still
solve the inefficiency and how much he can gain from the informational advantage if the
agents are not committed to using his service. Will agents always operate through an
intermediary if he provides the most efficient way to collaborate? Finally, what is the
optimal structure of the market of intermediaries - do agents benefit from competition
between intermediaries?
In my model a pair of individuals think about collaborating with each other, making
a partnership. As I want to model an informational part, I do not consider the moral
hazard aspect of the partnership problem but assume that the success of the partnership
crucially depends on types of both agents but not on their efforts. Suppose we have a
partnership of two songwriters - one of them is a composer who writes music, and
another is a lyricist. Songwriters might differ substantially in their types (it might be
their ability, talent or experience in writing songs).The song is successful only in the
case the both music and lyrics are good.
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2.2 Literature review
The literature related to our model can be divided into two main groups according to
different aspects it is capturing that are addressed in our work: there is literature on
intermediaries in different economic situations, and then there is literature on informed
principal.
In their paper on structural holes Goyal and Vega-Redondon in [10] explore motives for
link formation when agents can either pay or extract rents from intermediation depend-
ing on their position in the network. They show that without capacity constraints a star
network emerges, where the central player acts as an intermediary and enjoys signifi-
cant rents from his position. On the contrary, with the presence of capacity constraints,
cycle is the equilibrium network, with no one agent being an intermediary (as no one is
essential for connecting any two others) and all getting the same payoffs.
A valuable group is literature on referrals. Montgomery in [23] examines the role of
employee referrals on the labor market with adverse selection. The model is two-period,
and workers can be of two types - high and low. Workers that are employed in the
first period recommend those linked to them. The ability of connected workers is ex-
ogenously correlated. Montgomery shows that in equilibrium companies will hire only
those second-period workers that were introduced by high ability employees. In the
second period, workers that were hired through an acquaintance receive wages below
their expected productivity, therefore a firm gets a positive expected profit. As firms
are competitive, the wage they are paying to the first-period workers exceeds their ex-
pected productivity because first-period workers also have an optional value that can
lead to a positive expected profit in the second period. Montgomery also investigates the
impact of network structure on wage dispersion: an increase in either network density
or correlation between the productivity of connected agents increases wage dispersion.
However, in this model the reference decision of first-period workers is non-strategic -
they always give references to any agents with whom they are connected.
Saloner, in [28] considers a dynamic model of references with reputation. There is
more than one competing referee that has received a signal about the abilities of his
candidates. On the one hand, each referee wants more of his candidates to be hired;
one the other hand, he also cares about their average quality. Thus, there is a trade-
off between recommending more friends or recommending fewer of them but of higher
quality. Each referee uses a cut-off strategy. As a result of the model, although the
referees act strategically, resulting equilibrium is efficient (so the result is the same as if
the firm itself got the signals that the referees had).
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Rubinstein and Wolinsky in [27] incorporate intermediaries in a bargaining and matching
framework. In their work, a market consists of three types of agents - buyers, sellers and
intermediaries. This model doesn’t address the advantages of intermediation, as buyers
and sellers meet a middleman by some exogenous process.
A large strand of literature considers the role of the intermediary in trade. Gehrig
in [9] looks at the intermediary in the market with costly search. Buyers and sellers
choose between direct trade or trade through an intermediary who purchases and sells
products. The intermediary offers the service of immediacy by posting the bid and ask
prices directly, thus allowing agents to avoid the costly search. The author finds that
traders with low gains from trade are not willing to pay intermediary costs and will go
for a direct trade. Monopolist intermediary will charge positive spread, while in case of
competition the classical Bertrand result applies.
Stahl in [30] and Yanelle in [31] look at two-sided price competition. They find that
non-Walrasian equilibria with positive bid-ask spreads may emerge, even when inter-
mediation technology is costless because intermediaries offer attractive bid prices, and
obtain a monopoly position towards buyers. Moreover, the existence of equilibrium may
be problematic.
Garella in [8] looks at trade with asymmetric information, and finds that intermediation
may complete the market system when asymmetric information causes failure without
one. This result is obtained under the hypothesis that the intermediary randomizes the
price offers to the seller.
As intermediary is the person who at the same time possesses information and proposes
a contract this is related to the problem of informed principal (e.g.Mayerson in [25];
Maskin and Tirole in [19] and [20]; Severinov in [29]). However, in my model the main
question is not the one of the contract design, and in fact intermediary is restricted to
a very particular type of contracts that I am interested in.
Ivashina in [15] looks at the information intermediary role of banks in fortifying acqui-
sitions. Banks through long-term relational contracts with their clients get access to
their private information which they later might pass to potential acquires. The most
plausible motive for this is that the banks try to transfer debt from weaker clients to a
more stronger ones. Unlike their case I am looking at two-sided asymmetric information.
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2.3 Basic Model
In the baseline model I look at the situation when the reward intermediary can ask for
(I call it wage hereafter) is fixed exogenously. This is the first step on the way to a more
realistic model where intermediary can decide on the amount of wage.
2.3.1 Description of the game
I am looking at the Bayesian game with three players: agent 1 (Ag1), agent 2 (Ag2), and
an intermediary (Int). Two agents are thinking about collaborating with each other.
In the game potential collaborators can be either of high or low types (Θ = {H, L}),
probability of being high type is p. Types are assigned independently. If agents decide
to collaborate, an individual success realizes for each of them independently with ph
or pl depending on their type (pl < ph < 1). Agents know their own type but they
do not know the type of each other which is the source of uncertainty for them. The
collaboration is successful only in case both agents succeeded on their parts.
Intermediary has full information about players types. Observing this, he may decide
to send what I call ”an intermediation offer” (the content of it is specified later). At
the next stage agents decide how they would like to collaborate with each other: either
through an intermediary if he had offered such an option, or directly, or don’t want at
all.
The timing of the game is following:
Stage 0. Nature determines the agents types.
Stage 1. Intermediary observes agents types and decides whether he wants to send
intermediation offers or not.
Stage 2. Agents receive or do not receive an offer and based on this decide how they
want to be connected.
Stage 3. Links are formed.
For convenience I introduce the following notation: H+ denotes an information set where
a high type agent receives an intermediation offer; L+ describes an information set where
a low type individual have received an intermediation offer; H- for the information
set where a high type individual hasn’t received an offer; finally, L- stands for the
information set in which a low type agent hasn’t received any intermediation offer.
Therefore, information sets IAg1 = IAg2 = I = {H+, H−, L+, L−}.
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I look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that is stable to bilateral deviations.
Here I expanded the standard concept of PBE to allow also for stability with respect to
bilateral deviations. Stability to bilateral deviation lies in the hart of the paradox de-
scribed above that once agents are offered an intermediation offer they might reevaluate
their decision and prefer to collaborate without any intermediary.
I consider bilateral deviation in the ex ante fashion so that agents would like to bilaterally
deviate if it gives them higher expected payoff before knowing which type they are.
Definition 2.1. There is a profitable bilateral deviation from the strategy profile (s∗Ag1 ,s
∗
Ag2
,s∗Int)
when for some (i, j) ⊂ (Ag1, Ag2, Int) ∃ (si, sj) ( si ∈ Si, sj ∈ Sj) such that EUi(si,sj , s∗−{i, j}) ≥
EUi(s
∗
i ,s
∗
j ,s
∗
−{i, j}) and EUj(si,sj ,s
∗
−{i, j}) ≥ EUj(s∗i ,s∗j ,s∗−{i, j}) with at least one of the
inequalities being strict.
Definition 2.2. A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗Ag1 ,s
∗
Ag2
,s∗Int) and a belief system µ
∗ =
(µ∗Ag1 (I),µ∗Ag2 (I)) constitute a symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that is stable
to bilateral deviations if
i) s∗ is sequentially rational under µ∗
ii) there is no profitable bilateral deviation under µ∗
iii) µ∗ is derived by a bayes rule whenever possible
and iv) s∗Ag1 = s
∗
Ag2
and µ∗Ag1 (·) = µ∗Ag2 (·).
2.3.2 Payoffs
There are three types of payoffs in this model: payoff agent gets when collaborates
directly with another agent without any third party; what they can get when they
accept the offer of an intermediary and collaborate through him; and finally, the payoff
of an intermediary
Direct collaboration is always costly - agents have to invest in establishing new relation-
ships, so they have to pay c irrespective of whether collaboration is successful or not. On
the other hand, the gain of connection is random and depends on types of both agents.
If two agents decided to collaborate directly the probability their collaboration is suc-
cessful is pAg1pAg2 . In case their collaboration turns out to succeed it brings participants
the value of 2δ which they divide equally.
In the case agents chose to accept the offer of an intermediary, the latter offers a par-
ticular contract to the agents. Here, I restrict attention to the contract I am interested
Chapter 2. Informed middleman and asymmetric information 9
in. There an intermediary promises an agent to compensate him in case collaboration
failed due to the fault of another agent. So, he makes a payment that is conditional on
personal successes of the agents in their part of the project and not conditional on the
success of collaboration as a whole. In case he was successful on his part of the project
agent gets δ − w, where w is what I denoted by a wage of an intermediary. The rest
of the value generated goes to the intermediary. So, if the agent was successful (which
happens with pAg1), independently of what has happened to his partner this period, he
gets (δ − w), and if he wasn’t (with 1− pAg1) he gets nothing.
Now, let’s look at what an intermediary can get from his service. When agents accepted
his service and both were successful (which happens with pAg1pAg2), intermediary gets
2w from them (w from each agent). However, if exactly one of the agents has failed
intermediary pays to another (δ − w).
So, intermediary gets paid when the collaboration he is bridging is successful. In case
collaboration failed but there was one agent who succeeded on his part of the project,
intermediary compensates this agent. And if the project has failed because both agents
failed with their parts an intermediary gets zero. This specific form of contract, though
artificial at the first sight, describes what is going on in some areas of business where
intermediary play crucial roles. According to the article of D. Starosta in ”Clubbing
space” magazine booking agents ”...[G]uarantee the payment of forfeit to the artist,
in case the concert didn’t take place, and at the same time booker guarantees the
performance to promoters, and if anything should provide another artist of the same
style”.
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2.4 Results
There are many different possibilities for equilibria for different values of c and w. In
some equilibria intermediary is inactive while in others he participates in the collabora-
tion.
The region of special interest is area where c ∈ [pl (pph + (1− p) pl) δ; plphδ]. Here a cost
of direct collaboration is quite high so that low type agents don’t want to collaboration
with ex ante unknowns type. At the same time it’s not sufficiently high to rule out the
temptation of low types to collaboration with a high type. This conflict results in no
pure strategies equilibrium under such c in case there is no intermediary present.
2.4.1 No intermediary baseline
Theorem 2.3. When c ∈ [pl(pph + (1− p)pl)δ, phplδ] in the absence of an intermediary
the only PBE stable to bilateral deviations is a mixed strategies PBE where high type
agent always goes for direct link, and low type agent goes for a link with probability
β = phplδ−c
c−p2l δ
p
1−p
2.
In mixed strategy equilibrium case with probability β2 an inefficient match of two low
agents is formed, moreover with probability (1− β) an efficient match of high and low
agent is not formed - so, there are two sources of inefficiency that can not be avoided in
this setting due to lack of information. Here, low type agent is the vulnerable one who
needs more information about his potential partner.
2.4.2 Presence of an intermediary
Compared to a baseline game without an intermediary, intermediary game can lead to
a drastically different result.
First, I look at different possibilities for bilateral deviations and conditions that bilateral
deviation proofness require.
Suppose that in some strategy profile {s1, s2, sInt} intermediary makes an offer to
matches M =
{
Θ˜i × Θ˜j
}
∈ Θ × Θ and agents accept this offer. Then, for this strat-
egy profile to be stable to bilateral deviations by two agents I have to check that there
are no s′1 , s′2 : s′i
(
Θ˜i, no offer
)
= si
(
Θ˜i, no offer
)
, s′i
(
Θ\Θ˜i, ·
)
=si
(
Θ\Θ˜i, ·
)
but
s′i
(
Θ˜i, offer
)
= {direct collaboration} for i = {1, 2}. There are four possibilities for (Θ˜1,
2Most of the profs are in Appendix
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Θ˜2) that an intermediary can offer his service to: 1) (Θ˜1× Θ˜2) = {HH}, 2) (Θ˜1× Θ˜2) =
{HH, HL, LH}, 3) (Θ˜1 × Θ˜2) = {LL}, and 4) (Θ˜1 × Θ˜2) = {HH, HL, LH, LL}. In
the description of equilibria below I am covering all of these possibilities for bilateral
deviations.
Another possibility for a bilateral deviation is that an intermediary and one of the agents
deviate. For this to be a profitable deviation in must be that actions of two agents do
not coincide in the information sets where they get the offer of an intermediary. It
happens only when intermediary provides service to a match of LL , while all others are
collaborating directly. In this equilibrium it should be that in H+ agent chooses to col-
laborate directly, otherwise the intermediary would have been happy to provide an offer
to matches containing high type agents either. In case the cost of direct collaboration is
sufficiently high the agent might prefer to change his action in H+ information set, and
intermediary would then prefer to send an offer to more matches. The condition for no
bilateral deviation is 2 (phplδ − c) > (δ − w) (ph + pl).
Now I go through different regions for the wage of an intermediary and look at equilibria
in these regions.
Theorem 2.4. When w ≤ (1− ph) δ the only PBE stable to bilateral deviations of an
intermediary game is the same as that of a no-intermediary game where high type agent
always goes for direct link, and low type agent goes for a link with β = phplδ−c
c−p2l δ
p
1−p .
Obviously, when the wage of an intermediary is so low that he is not interested in
participating even when he faces the best match possible, the situation is just the same
as in the case of no intermediary.
Theorem 2.5. When w ∈
[
(1− ph) δ;
(
1− 2phplph+pl
)
δ
]
and c ≥ ph (w − (1− ph) δ) in
addition to a no intermediary equilibrium there is another one where a pair of high type
agents HH collaborate through an intermediary, HL collaborate directly with probability
(1− β), and LL do it with probability β2.
The result above states that when the wage of an intermediary is a bit higher (such that
he is interested in working only with the best possible match) but not too high compared
to the cost (so that even knowing for sure the type of their potential partner agents still
want to make deal with an intermediary) there is another equilibrium possible where a
pair of high type agents are collaborating indirectly, and all others behaving just as they
did without an intermediary.
Theorem 2.6. When w ∈
[(
1− 2phplph+pl
)
δ; (1− pl) δ
]
and c > δph(pph+2(1−p)pl)−(δ−w)(ph+(1−p)pl)p+2(1−p)
in addition to no intermediary equilibrium there is another one where pairs of HH and
HL collaborate through intermediary, while pair of LL does not collaborate at all.
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When the wage of an intermediary is even higher so that he is willing to work with any
match except the worst one, there is an equilibrium when good and average matches (HH
and HL) work through intermediary, while the bad match of LL does not collaborate at
all which is actually good thing to do for the agents. In this equilibrium absence of the
offer of an intermediary provides full information to low type agents about their partner
and helps them to stay away from the inefficient match.
Theorem 2.7. When w ≥ (1− pl) δ and (pph + (1− p) pl) (δ − w) ≥ p2
(
p2hδ − c
)
+
(1− p)2 pl (δ − w) in addition to no intermediary equilibrium there is another one where
every pair of agents collaborate indirectly through an intermediary.
Theorem 2.8. When w ≥ (1− pl) δ, 2 (phplδ − c) > (δ − w) (ph + pl) and c > pl (w − (1− pl) δ)
in addition to no intermediary equilibrium there is another one where the pair of low
type agents LL collaborates indirectly, while HL and HH choose direct collaboration.
There are several equilibria with intermediary that are possible in the highest wage
region - either all matches collaborate through an intermediary, or only the worst match
is intermediated and all others are working directly.
These equilibria are more efficient than the no intermediary one. Situation when an
intermediary works with the LL match allows to overcome both inefficiencies that arise
without intermediary. First, bad matches of LL never work directly with each other,
they only collaborate through an intermediary which is efficient. From the economy
point of view collaboration through an intermediary is free, because neither agents nor
intermediary do have to pay the cost of collaboration. So from the social planner per-
spective the best thing is if all matches work through an intermediary. Second, in this
equilibrium the average match of HL agents always collaborate. This is again an im-
provement with respect to the case of no intermediary as in the latter case agents in
HL match used to collaborate with probability less than one.
The next claim shows that equilibrium where everyone collaborate through an interme-
diary is more efficient (the total welfare is higher) than no intermediary equilibrium.
Claim 2.9. The total welfare is higher in the equilibrium where every match collaborates
through an intermediary that in equilibrium with no intermediary at all.
Let me sum up what we’ve learned from this section: the higher is the wage of an
intermediary, the more willing he is to work with worse matches. If his wage is low
he works only with the best match HH; when the wage is higher he also works with
average match HL; finally when his wage is really high he starts working with the bad
match LL. The case of the highest wage results in a branching of equilibria into two -
we might have the situation that intermediary works with all matches, or he works only
with bad match.
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2.5 Endogenous wage
Now when we have discussed what can happen in the game with predetermined wage
I allow an intermediary to set his wage. Intermediary does it before knowing types of
agents which seems to be a reasonable assumption - like a booking agent who has set
wage for his service before having any knowledge of which are the bands and promoters
he’s going to work with.
2.5.1 Monopoly intermediary
The timing of the new game is following:
Stage 1. Intermediary decides on the wage w∗ he is willing to ask for
Stage 2. Nature defines the combination of types of agents that is realized
Stage 3. Intermediary observes agents types and decides whether he wants to send
intermediation offers or not.
Stage 4. Agents receive or do not receive an offer and based on this decide on how
they want to collaborate. Even not haven received the offer agents see the wage w∗ an
intermediary has set.
Stage 5. Collaborations are/are not formed.
There are four possibility for an intermediary with respect to what matches he can aim
for at the equilibrium: he can either work only with HH, or only with LL , or everybody
except LL, and finally he can intermediate everyone. The wage he can set in each of the
variants is defined by the bilateral deviation condition.
When he works only with HH he may set the wage as high as w∗HH =
c
ph
+ (1− ph) δ.
His expected payoff under this wage is piHH = 2cp
2.
When he works only with LL he may set the wage as high as w∗LL =
c
pl
+ (1− pl) δ. His
expected payoff under this wage is piLL = 2c (1− p)2.
When an intermediary aims for everybody except LL pair (I denote this case by LL)
he can set the wage as high as w∗
LL
= (2−p)ph+(1−p)pl c+
((1−p)pl+ph(1−2pl(1−p)−pph))δ
ph+(1−p)pl . At this
wage he gets piLL = 2c(2− p)p.
Finally, an intermediary may work with every type of agents. He sets the wage w∗ =
δ − p(p
2
hδ−c)
ph+(1−p)pl and gets pi
∗ = 2pc p¯ph+(1−p)pl +
2p¯δ(1−p)pl(ph+pph+pl−ppl)
ph+pl−ppl .
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Even if intermediary knows for sure that agents are going to accept the offer he makes,
he still might have different preferences over equilibria for various parameter values. The
general pattern looks like this: when p is low, intermediary receives highest expected
payoff in LL equilibrium3; when p is average, he gets the highest payoff in equilibrium
where he works with all matches; finally, when p is high, he prefers LL equilibrium4.
When intermediary sets some wage w he receives pi (w) = pi (w, CE (w, c)), where
CE (w, c) ∈ CE (w, c) is some continuation equilibrium played in a game with the cost
of direct connection c after an intermediary sets w; and CE (w, c) is the set of all possible
continuation equilibria when cost is c and wage w. I denote by NIE a no-intermediary
continuation equilibrium - an equilibrium played after wage w where agents do not use
an intermediary and are not collaborating through him.
Claim 2.10. Under any c there is a unique equilibrium where intermediary 1) works
with LL matches only and sets w˜∗ = w∗LL =
c
pl
+ (1− pl) δ (when p is low); 2)
works with all combinations of agents and sets w˜∗ = w∗ = δ − p(p
2
hδ−c)
ph+(1−p)pl (when p
is average); 3) works with all matches except LL and sets w˜∗ = w∗
LL
= (2−p)ph+(1−p)pl c +
((1−p)pl+ph(1−2pl(1−p)−pph))δ
ph+(1−p)pl (when p is high) iff NIE /∈ CE (w˜∗, c).
Proof. First, suppose that the strategy profile where intermediary sets w˜∗ is indeed a
unique equilibrium in the game. Then it should be that NIE /∈ CE (w˜∗, c). Indeed,
suppose that NIE was a part of continuation equilibrium when wage w˜∗ is set. In
that case another wage (corresponding to the second largest expected payoff for the
intermediary) would be also an equilibrium wage, as after deviation to w˜∗ NIE might
be played.
Other way, suppose that NIE /∈ CE (w˜∗, c). Then indeed the only equilibrium is
the one where intermediary sets w˜∗. It is obvious that w˜∗ is an equilibrium wage, as
any deviation from it brings intermediary lower expected payoff. No other wage w′
could be an equilibrium wage as there would be a profitable deviation to w˜∗ for an
intermediary.
Unfortunately, when c ≤ plphδ NIE ∈ CE ( w˜∗, c), which means that under this c
equilibrium in monopoly intermediary case is not unique. As for ∀w in this region
NIE ∈ CE (w, c) any wage can be supported as an equilibrium.
3If ph ∈
[
pl; pl
3+
√
5
2
]
, p <Root[p2h − p2l +
(−3p2h − 4phpl + 3p2l )x+ (7phpl − 3p2l )x2 + (p2h − 3phpl +
p2l )x
3, 1]
If p > pl
3+
√
5
2
, p <Root[p2h − p2l +
(−3p2h − 4phpl + 3p2l )x+ (7phpl − 3p2l )x2 + (p2h − 3phpl + p2l )x3, 2]
4p >
phpl+p
2
l
p2
h
−phpl+p2l
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Due to the multiplicity not much can be said about the outcome of the game in this
case, and therefore some refinement is needed. I assume that if there is a Pareto inferior
equilibrium it is never played. It turns out that NIE is a Pareto inferior equilibrium
here, as for any wage that an intermediary sets there is an intermediary equilibrium that
Pareto dominates NIE.
Theorem 2.11. Under the refinement specified above the only equilibrium in the game
with a monopoly intermediary is the one where intermediary 1) works with LL matches
only and sets w˜∗ = w∗LL when p is low; 2) works with all combinations of agents and
sets w˜∗ = w∗ when p is intermediate; 3) works with all matches except LL and sets
w˜∗ = w∗
LL
when p is high
When p is low intermediary makes an offer to a pair of low type agents. The offer
provides full information to the low type agent about their potential partner - in both
cases if they have or have not received the offer. This is important as low type agents
that has not received an offer knows that they face a high type agent and happily go
for direct partnership. In this equilibrium LL collaborate through intermediary, and all
others do it directly.
When p is average intermediary makes an offer to all types of matches. This equilibrium
is efficient as collaboration through an intermediary maximizes the total welfare. Here
intermediary does not provide any additional information to the agent in equilibrium,
and agents accept it as given the wage of the offer their no-bilateral-deviation constraint
is still satisfied.
When p is high intermediary makes an offer to any combination of agents except the pair
of low types. Agents that get an offer accept it, while agents that do not get the offer
stay not connected. Here the lack of an offer provides full information for the low type
agent about their potential partner, and helps to stay away of the inefficient matches
with another low type agent. It is a welfare improvement compared to no intermediary
case.
2.5.2 Two intermediaries
Suppose now that there are two potential intermediaries NInt = {I1, I2}. Before
observing the realization of types each of them sets a wage w∗i . After that intermediaries
observe realization of the match, the wage their opponent has set and decide whether
they want to propose their service or not. Then the game continues just as described
for the case of exogenous w with the difference that now each agent has also to decide
on which intermediary they would like to work with if any.
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The timing of the game is following.
1. Both intermediaries simultaneously set their wages w1 and w2.
2. Nature realizes uncertainty about the match.
3. Intermediaries observe types of agents and the opponents wage, and decide whether
they want to send offer or not (AInt1 (θag1 , θag2, w1, w2), AInt2 (θag1 , θag2, w1, w2) ∈ {0,
1}).
4. Agents receive offers from two intermediaries or only from one, or from none of them.
They decide on the offer if any. Aagi(θi,AInt1 ,AInt2 , w1, w2) ∈
{accept offer of an intermediary, continue without an intermediary, do not continue}.
5. Uncertainty realizes and the payments are made.
The strategy of each agent here is si : Θ× [0, δ]2 ×AInt1 ×AInt2
→ {Intermediary 1, Intermediary 2, not connected, direct}, and strategies of intermedi-
aries are sInt : {w; [0, δ]2 ×M→{send; do not send}.
Lemma 2.12. Let s′ =
(
s′1, s′2, s′Int1, s
′
Int2
)
and s′′ =
(
s′′1, s′′2, s′′Int1, s
′′
Int2
)
be two
strategy profiles where w1 > w2, and let M = {m1, ...mk} be the matches for which
the intermediaries both make an offer5, where (s′1, s′2) applied to [w1, w2, offer by Int1,
offer by Int2] at any m ∈ M has the acceptance of w1, and (s′′1, s′′2) applied to [w1, w2,
offer by Int1, offer by Int2] at any m ∈M has the acceptance of w2. Then, both agents
get higher expected payoff in s′′ than in s′.
Proof. Indeed, for any i ∈ {1, 2} : Epii(s′′1, s′′2, s′′Int1 , s′′Int2) =
∑
{θ1, θ2}=m⊆M p (θ1) p (θ2) pi (δ − w2)+(
1−∑{θ1, θ2}=m⊆M p (θ1) p (θ2))Epii >∑{θ1, θ2}=m⊆M p (θ1) p (θ2) pi (δ − w1) +(
1−∑{θ1, θ2}=m⊆M p (θ1) p (θ2))Epii = Epii(s′1, s′2, s′Int1 , s′Int2). The first term∑
{θ1, θ2}=m⊆M p (θ1) p (θ2) pi (δ − w2) is expected payoff from choosing the service of in-
termediary 2 when any of the matches in M was realized. The second term is expected
payoff when any other match m˜ ∈M\M was realized. As w2 < w1, Epii(s′′1, s′′2, s′′Int1 , s′′Int2) >
Epii(s
′
1, s
′
2, s
′
Int1
, s′Int2).
Theorem 2.13. There does not exist a PBE stable to bilateral deviations where both
intermediaries set the same wage w1 = w2 = w.
Proof. Suppose that there is a PBE stable to bilateral deviations where w1 = w2 = w.
In this case I assume that agents just go with equal probability for the offer of each of
5where M ⊆M, and M = {HH, HL, LH, LL} is the set of all possible matches
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the intermediaries. Under w intermediaries provide service to some subset of matches
M ⊆ M. First, I show that in equilibrium of this form both intermediaries should get
zero expected payoff; second, I show that there would always be a profitable deviation
for some intermediary.
Let’s assume that intermediaries get positive expected payoff. This means that w > w,
where w is the lowest wage when it is still profitable for intermediary to provide ser-
vice to M . M can be either {HH, HL, LH, LL}, {HH}, {HH, HL, LH}, or {LL}.
Here a strategy of an intermediary sInt : {w; w ×M→{send; do not send}}. First,
let’s consider cases when M 6= {LL}. In that case any intermediary (without loss of
generality intermediary 1) has an incentive to deviate set w′ = w − . Due to the
above Lemma ?? agents would accept the offer of an intermediary 1, and his devia-
tion from s∗Int1 = (w, send if M) to sInt1 = (w
′, send if M) would be profitable. Ex-
pected payoff intermediary gets after the deviation is EpiInt1
(
sInt1 , s
∗
Int2
, s∗Ag1 , s
∗
Ag2
)
=∑
{θi, θj}∈M p (θi) p (θj)pi (θi, θj , w
′), where p (θi) =
{
p, if θi = H
1− p, if θi = L
}
, is just proba-
bility of the type θi; and pi (θi, θj , w
′) is the payoff intermediary gets when he provides
service to the match {θi, θj} under w′. When  is sufficiently small (so, that w′ is
very close to w) EpiInt1
(
sInt1 , s
∗
Int2
, s∗Ag1 , s
∗
Ag2
)
> EpiInt1
(
s∗Int1 , s
∗
Int2
, s∗Ag1 , s
∗
Ag2
)
=∑
{θi, θj}∈M
1
2p (θi) p (θj)pi (θi, θj , w).
So, when M 6= {LL} there can not be an equilibrium where intermediaries get posi-
tive expected payoff. Suppose that intermediaries set w = w, such that they get zero
expected payoff. Then, any intermediary has an incentive to deviate to some wage
w′ where he provides service to some M ′, such that w′ > w′, where w′ is zero-profit
wage for a match M ′. Without loss of generality, I assume that intermediary 1 de-
viates from s∗Int1 = (w, send if M) to sInt1 = (w
′, send if M ′). After the deviation
EpiInt1
(
sInt1 , s
∗
Int2
, s∗Ag1 , s
∗
Ag2
)
=
∑
{θi, θj}∈M ′∩{θi, θj}/∈M p (θi) p (θj)pi (θi, θj , w
′) > 0
if M ′ ∩M c 6= ∅ and w′ > w (where M c is an complement set of M), or
EpiInt1
(
sInt1 , s
∗
Int2
, s∗Ag1 , s
∗
Ag2
)
=
∑
{θi, θj}∈M ′ p (θi) p (θj)pi (θi, θj , w
′) > 0. Therefore,
the deviation would be profitable.
To complete the analysis I consider the case of M = {LL}. Equilibrium where interme-
diary connects LL exists only when no bilateral-deviation conditions are satisfied w ≤ δ,
and w ≥ 2c+(ph+pl−2phpl)δph+pl . So, if intermediaries in equilibrium target M = {LL} they
set the wage w > w and always get positive profit. Just in similar fashion as I have
shown that there can not be equilibrium where intermediaries get positive profit, I can
show that there can not be equilibrium where w > 2c+(ph+pl−2phpl)δph+pl which is the mini-
mum wage where equilibrium of intermediary working with LL match exists. Therefore,
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if there is an equilibrium of this form it should be that w = 2c+(ph+pl−2phpl)δph+pl . How-
ever, expected payoff from targeting LL match under wage w = 2c+(ph+pl−2phpl)δph+pl is
lower than targeting all matches and setting w = δ − p(p
2
hδ−c)
ph+(1−p)pl . Therefore, some in-
termediary may want to deviate from s∗Int1 =
(
2c+(ph+pl−2phpl)δ
ph+pl
, send if LL
)
to sInt1 =(
δ − p(p
2
hδ−c)
ph+(1−p)pl , send all the time
)
, and this deviation is profitable. Therefore, there
can not be a symmetric equilibrium where intermediaries work with LL.
The intuition behind this theorem is very straightforward. When two intermediaries set
some wage where they get positive profit they would like to undercut one another and
get the whole market. While in case they set wage that gives them zero expected profit
every each of them would want to set the wage targeting some different types of agents
where he gets positive profit.
Lemma 2.14. Suppose that intermediaries set w1 6= w2 and target M1 and M2. Then,
in PBE stable to bilateral deviations it can not happen that under both w1 and w2 it is
profitable to work with both M1 and M2.
Proof. Suppose that in PBE stable to bilateral deviations under both w1 and w2 it
is profitable to work with both M1 and M2. Then intermediary 2 can deviate from
s∗Int2 = (w2, send if M2) to sInt2 = (w2, send if M1 ∪M2). His expected payoff after
deviation is Epi
(
s∗Int1 , sInt2 , s
∗
Ag1
, s∗Ag2
)
=
∑
{θi , θj}∈M1∪M2 p (θi) p (θj)pi (θi, θj , w2) >∑
{θi, θj}∈M2 p (θi) p (θj)pi (θi, θj , w2) = Epi
(
s∗Int1 , s
∗
Int2
, s∗Ag1 , s
∗
Ag2
)
, so the deviation
is profitable.
This Lemma 2.14 rules out situations when, for example, both w1, w2 > (1− pl) δ,
and Intermediary 1 targets M1 = {HH, HL}, Intermediary 2 targets M2 = {HL, LL}.
Under this wages working with any match is profitable, therefore intermediary offer-
ing lowest wage (Intermediary 2) can switch to targeting a larger subset of matches
{HH, HL, LL}.
Theorem 2.15. There does not exist a PBE stable to bilateral deviations where w1 6= w2.
Proof. First, I show that intermediaries target by their wages different matches - that
is each intermediary is an ex post monopolist in his wage region; then I prove that
each intermediary should get the maximum possible payoff in this wage region; finally, I
should that (for not degenerate parameter values) there is always a profitable deviation.
Suppose that there exists a PBE stable to bilateral deviations where w1 6= w2. Intermedi-
ary 1 provides service in equilibrium for some subset of matches M1 ⊆M, intermediary
2 provides service to M2 ⊆M. Without loss of generality I assume w1 > w2.
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First, I want to show that intermediaries are ex post monopolists in their wage regions -
this means that when intermediary i targets some matchm∗ ∈Mi, then he is the only one
who targets m∗. Suppose this was not the case, and the match m∗ is targeted by both
intermediaries. Due to the Lemma 2.14 I can concentrate on the case where M = m∗
is the only match that both intermediaries are targeting. Then, intermediary 1 has a
profitable deviation from s∗Int1 = (w1, send if M) to
{
sInt1=(w2−, send if M), if w2>w2
sInt1=(w2, send if M), if w2=w2
}
.
This deviation is profitable.
Next I want to show that there can not be a PBE stable to bilateral deviations where
∀ i, w∗i ∈ [wi, wi). Indeed, suppose that there is such an equilibrium, and in this
equilibrium intermediary i provides service to someMi ⊂M. As he is ex post monopolist
to matches in Mi intermediary i could deviate from the strategy s
∗
Inti
(w∗i , send if Mi)
to the strategy sInti (wi, send if Mi) where wi > w
∗
i and the deviation is profitable.
Therefore, the only equilibrium candidate is the one when any intermediary i sets wi =
w¯i, where w¯i is the largest possible wage under which one can work with the matches
Mi.Then intermediary i that gets lower expected payoff of two has an incentive to
deviate from the strategy s∗Inti = (w¯i, Mi) to sInti = (w¯j − , Mj) and this deviation is
profitable.
The only possibility for an equilibrium to exist is when both intermediaries get the
same expected payoff by setting wages w¯1, w¯2, and targeting M1, M2; and at the same
time they can not get higher expected payoff by targeting some other match m3 ∈
M\{M1 ∪M2} and setting w¯3.
So, it turns out that in the game with two competing intermediaries there is no PBE in
pure strategies stable to bilateral deviations. This happens due to the fact that there
are too many matches and too few intermediaries that aim at these matches. Even if
intermediaries set different wages and target different matches there would always be a
profitable deviation for some of them. This potential deviation has three components -
if intermediary is unsatisfied with expected profit he gets he might either aim at another
match; or he can rise the wage still aiming for the same combination of types (and he
can do it if he’s a monopolist in this region - so, if another intermediary aims for different
matches), or he might undercut the second intermediary. All these result in nonexistence
of an equilibrium in this kind of a game. There is a need for a tighter competition
between intermediaries to equilibrate the system. Even though here intermediaries are
not monopolists ex ante they turn out to be monopolists ex post on the market of services
for the specific match they are working with. However, being a monopolist ex post in
their particular wage region ruins the equilibrium of a price setting game ex ante.
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This nonexistence result is similar to nonexistence in screening models. Just like there
intermediaries here aim their offers at different types, as they know that in subsequent
equilibrium this particular types would accept it. One of the ways to cope with nonexis-
tence problem in screening is the concept of reactive equilibrium. It allows the obedient
agent to react to the deviation of another agent. Only deviations that can not bring
losses given the reaction are allowed.
In my model an intermediary can never suffer losses in expected terms, the worst situ-
ation for him is that he gets zero. Therefore, the exact type of argument that works in
reaction equilibrium is not applicable here.
In case we modify reaction equilibrium concept and look only at deviations that bring
positive payoffs given the reaction of an obedient agent we still have problems as this a
too harsh way to tackle nonexistence problem. Instead of nonexistence we get multiple
equilibrium where every combination of wages will be an equilibrium. Indeed, when
intermediary deviates to w′ obedient agent can always react with w′ − , and leave the
deviator with zero expected surplus. If I allow for these type of reactions any combination
of wages can be part of an equilibrium.
So, we see that though monopoly intermediary does restore efficiency and improves
the welfare, competition between intermediaries ruins the equilibrium and it’s not even
possible to predict outcome of the game.
On the other hand, it is interesting to get nonexistence similar to Rothschild-Stiglitz in
a different type of game. As reactive equilibrium does not work in this setting there is
a need for a different idea about tackling the problem. It might also be useful to run an
experiment and see if there is any pattern in participants behavior.
2.5.3 More than two intermediaries
We’ve seen in previous section that ex post competition between intermediaries is in-
sufficient to provide the existence of equilibrium. A natural question here is what is
the minimal number of intermediaries needed for equilibrium to exist and what is the
properties of this equilibrium.
Theorem 2.16. Suppose we have N intermediaries. If there exist a PBE equilibrium
stable to bilateral deviations then in this equilibrium every match m ∈ M is approached
at least by two intermediaries.
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Proof. First, I want to show that no match m ∈ M can be targeted only by one inter-
mediary. Then, I show that there can not be a match that is not targeted at least by
some intermediary.
It is easy to show that if some match m is approached by only one intermediary i there
can not be an equilibrium where intermediary sets wi < w¯i. Then, if there exist some
other match m′ that is approached by more than one intermediary it is easy to show
that those intermediaries will set the lowest possible wage where they get zero expected
payoff from working with m′. Therefore, any of intermediaries working with m′ can
deviate to sIntj (w¯i − , m) and get positive expected payoff.
If there is no such match m′ targeted by two intermediaries, then any other intermediary
j is also an ex post monopolist for some match mj , therefore there again can not be an
equilibrium where they set wj < w¯j . Then if ∃j ∈ {1,...,i− 1, i+ 1, N} : Epij(w¯j) <
Epii(w¯i), j would like to deviate from s
∗
Intj
(w¯j , Mj) to sIntj (w¯i − , Mi) and enjoy
higher payoff. In case there’s no j that gets lower payoff than intermediary i but ∃j ∈
{1,...,i− 1, i+ 1, N} : pij(w¯j) > pii(w¯i), i would like to deviate to sInti(w¯j − , Mj)
and enjoy higher payoff. The only way there can be such an equilibrium is when for
∀j ∈ {1,...,i− 1, i+ 1, N} : pij(w¯j) = pii(w¯i) which requires very specific parameter and
is a very fragile condition for existence of equilibrium. Moreover, for the specific game
of mine it is just generally not true.
Now I show that there can not be a match that is not addressed by some intermediary.
Suppose indeed ∃ m˜ ∈ M that does not receive any offer of an intermediary. According
to what is said above all intermediaries are no ex post monopolists for the match they
are targeting, therefore they receive zero expected payoff. Then, any intermediary i can
deviate to sInti (w
′
i, m˜) where w
′
i is such wage where he targets m˜ and gets positive
expected payoff. Therefore, we have a contradiction.
These theorem tells us that in equilibrium every match should be coordinated by some
intermediary, and that no match can be coordinated by only one intermediary. So, there
should be an least twice as many intermediaries as there are different matches. For the
game I study at least 6 intermediaries are needed.
In that case there is both competition ex ante and ex post. In equilibrium all agents
interact only through intermediaries - there is no direct collaboration. Intermediaries
specialize on some particular type of matches that they work with - but they always
have competitor/s that specialize on the same matches.
It is worth talking about the information property of the equilibrium. The information
set of the agent is now richer because it also includes the wage. The wage itself does not
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bring any additional information as intermediary decides on it ex ante. However, when
N ≥ 6 intermediaries perfectly specialize, then the wage gives an agent full information
about the type of the partner. Still, this does not change agents behavior as no bilateral
deviation conditions (a bit different but very similar6) are always satisfied.
This equilibrium is efficient as all matches collaborate through an intermediary which
is a cheaper technology. All agents have perfect knowledge about the type of their
partner but they still prefer to use the offer of an intermediary because competition
between those has pushed the wage down. At the same time it is precisely the credit of
competition between intermediaries and subsequent specialization on particular matches
that lead to full information disclosure in equilibrium.
6They are the same for LL and HH matches. Condition for HL match is not ph (δ − w) > phpl − c,
and it’s always satisfied.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I study how informed intermediary restores efficiency when agents face
imperfect information. The paradox is that agents are not committed to pay the in-
termediary once he brings information to the table. This changes the incentive of an
intermediary to participate. I find that despite the lack of commitment monopoly inter-
mediary still restores the efficiency. The outcome of the game depends on the prevalence
of the high type because it determines the best equilibrium for the intermediary. In the
equilibrium intermediary either provides full information (by the fact of an offer in one
equilibrium or by the lack of it in another) to low type agents that are the most vulner-
able to incompleteness of information , or does not disclose any information at all. In
all equilibria presence of intermediary is welfare improving.
The situation changes when we add competition between intermediaries. If competition
is insufficient the equilibrium breaks and fails to exist (in a manner similar to Rothschild-
Stiglitz). Unfortunately, nonexistence here can not be tackled with the help of reactive
equilibrium concept and the question of appropriate solution concept is still open.
When the number of intermediaries rises sufficiently to guarantee competition ex post,
the only equilibrium is the one where intermediaries specialize on different matches.
Agents in every match receive offers from at least two intermediaries. The outcome of
the game is again efficient. However, unlike the monopoly case, the superior knowledge of
an intermediary is not unique (as there are many of them), and therefore, intermediaries
can not benefit from it.
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2.7 Appendix
Proof. Theorem 2.3 . Suppose that H believes that another H chooses direct collabo-
ration with µh and an L type agent chooses direct collaboration with µl. An L agent
believes that H chooses direct collaboration with νh and L chooses direct collaboration
with νl. Given this when H decides to participate in collaboration he expects to get
pµh
(
p2hδ − c
)
+ (1− p)µl (phplδ − c). When a low type agent chooses to go for a direct
collaboration he expects to get pνh (phplδ − c)+(1− p) νl
(
p2l δ − c
)
. First let us consider
four possibilities of pure strategies equilibrium: 1) both types of agents always choose
to participate in collaboration; 2) both types of agents do not want to participate in
collaboration; 3) high type agents always want to participate in collaboration, while low
types prefer not to do it; 4) high type agent prefer not to participate in collaboration,
while low type agents do want to participate.
1) In this case belief consistency requires µh = νh = µl = νl = 1. Then low type expects
to get from participating in collaboration pl (pph + (1− p) pl) δ − c < 0. Therefore this
can not be an equilibrium.
2) In this case belief consistency requires µh = νh = µl = νl = 0. Then both types
of agents expect to get 0 from participating in collaboration, and this can be a part
of equilibrium. However, this can not be part of equilibrium that is stable to bilateral
deviations a agents might bilaterally switch to a strategy profile where they participate
in collaboration in case the high type is realized to them. Under such new strategy
profile each of them gets expected payoff of p2
(
p2hδ − c
)
> 0, so the bilateral deviation
is profitable.
3) In this case belief consistency requires µh = νh = 1 and µl = νl = 0 . Then payoff
of a low type agent from participating is p (phplδ − c) > 0, which means that he would
like to take part in collaboration, and therefore initial construction can not be a part of
equilibrium.
4) In this case belief consistency requires µh = νh = 0 and µl = νl = 1. Given this both
types of agents would prefer to deviate as for high type agent payoff from participating
in collaboration is p (phplδ − c) > 0 and for low type agents it is (1− p)
(
p2l δ − c
)
< 0.
Therefore, there can not be an PBE stable to bilateral deviations in pure strategies.
Now let us look at possible equilibria in mixed strategies.
First of all let’s see if high type agent may participate in collaboration with some proba-
bility 0 < α < 1. Belief consistency requires that µh = νh = α. Then, payoff from going
for direct connection for a high type agent is pα (phplδ − c)+(1−p)µl (phplδ − c) > 0 for
∀µl. Therefore, in any mixed equilibrium high type agents always go for collaboration.
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It means that νh = 1. Then, expected payoff of a low type agent from going to direct
connection is p (phplδ − c)+(1− p) νl
(
p2l δ − c
)
. The only νl that can support this mixed
strategy equilibrium is the one where low type agents are indifferent between going for
direct connection or not being connected at all: νl =
p
1−p
phplδ−c
c−p2l δ
. So, there is a mixed
strategy equilibrium where high type agents always go for direct connection, while low
type agents go for direct connection with β = p1−p
phplδ−c
c−p2l δ
.
Proof. Theorem 2.4 . When w < (1− ph) δ intermediary does not want to propose his
offer for any combination of agents. Even if the best possible match of HH has realized
intermediary expects to get 2p2ph (w − (1− ph) δ) < 0 for ∀w < (1− ph) δ. Then the
situation is just the same as in case of no intermediary, therefore, equilibrium is also the
same.
Proof. Theorem 2.5 . When c ≥ ph (w − (1− ph) δ) two agents don’t want to deviate
bilaterally to another strategy profile where in case they are of high type they prefer
to participate in collaboration directly7. Under such wage intermediary would want to
provide his service only to a match of two high types, as even in case one of the agent is of
low type, expected payoff of an intermediary is (ph+pl)w− [ph(1−pl)+pl (1− ph)]δ < 0
for ∀w ∈
[
(1− ph) δ;
(
1− 2phplph+pl
)
δ
]
.
First, let’s see that reported strategy profile is indeed a PBE stable to bilateral devi-
ations. As was already discussed two agents don’t want to deviate and change their
behavior in the H+ information set. As intermediary sends an offer only to HH bilat-
erally changing to a strategy profile with different si (H+), sj (L+), or si (L+), sj (L+)
does not bring any additional payoff as L+ information set is always out of equilibrium.
Situation in information sets that correspond to no offer of an intermediary is similar
to that of no-intermediary (with only difference that possible matches here are HL and
LL, as HH match always receives the offer), therefore, the same behavior is part of
equilibrium here too.
Now, let’s see that there is no other equilibrium. The only other possibility is that there
might be an equilibrium where something different happens to HL and/or LL match.
It can’t be that HL and/or LL would collaborate indirectly as intermediary under such
wage does not want to deal with this matches. And it can not happen either that either
HL or LL would turn out to be collaborating directly as this might not be a part of
equilibrium due to the arguments of Theorem 2.3 .
7Deviation is unprofitable when p
(
p
(
p2hδ − c
)
+ (1− p)β (phplδ − c)
)
+
(1− p) (pβ (phplδ − c) + (1− p)β2 (p2l δ − c)) < p2ph (δ − w) + p (1− p)β (phplδ − c) +
(1− p) pβ (phplδ − c) + (1− p)2 β2
(
p2l δ − c
)
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Proof. Theorem 2.6 . Condition c > δphpph+2(1−p)pl)−(δ−w)(ph+(1−p)pl)p+2(1−p) specifies param-
eter values when there is no bilateral deviation8 by agents. Condition on wage of an
intermediary specifies a situation when intermediary is willing to work with matches of
HH and HL, but not with a match of LL.
Reported strategy profile is indeed an equilibrium. As discussed above agents do not
wont to change their behavior in informations sets that corresponds to the offer of an
intermediary. Neither do they want to behave differently in case they do not receive
an offer because H− information set is out of equilibrium and in L− information set
they behave optimally as they are able to avoid collaboration in an inefficient LL match.
Intermediary also behaves optimally as he sends an offer to the largest subset of matches
when it is still valuable for him to do so.
There is no other PBE stable to bilateral deviations except the two described as agents
behave optimally given that they receive the offer (as they do not want to bilaterally
deviate), and they will always receive the offer because this is optimal for an intermedi-
ary.
Proof. Theorem 2.7 . When w ≥ (1− pl) δ the wage of an intermediary is so high that he
is willing to intermediate any match, even the bad match of LL agents. The condition
on the cost of direct collaboration eliminate the bilateral deviations by agents9. So,
neither agents nor intermediary has any incentive to deviate.
Proof. Theorem 2.8 . As it was already said above in this wage region intermediary
is willing to provide his service to any combination of agents. The second condition
is a condition for no bilateral deviation by an intermediary and an agent. When the
above inequality holds agents do not want to change his behavior in H+ information
set provided that intermediary would also change his behavior and send an offer both
to HL and LL matches. The third condition on the cost of direct connection elim-
inates bilateral deviation by two agents. In the region of my main interest where
c ∈ [pl (pph + (1− p) pl) δ; plphδ] this last condition is always satisfied as the cost of
direct connection is already sufficiently high such that agents prefer to collaborate indi-
rectly in case the worst possible type has realized for them and their partners.
This is indeed an equilibrium as given the strategy of an intermediary all agents behave
optimally - both those that that have received an offer and have not. Intermediary also
8Bilateral deviation is unprofitable when pph (δ − w) + (1− p) ppl (δ − w) >
p
[
p
(
p2hδ − c
)
+ (1− p) (phplδ − c)
]
+ (1− p) p (phplδ − c)
9It seems that that agents can switch either to a strategy profile where they change behaviors only
in H+ information set (and get p2
(
p2hδ − c
)
+ (1− p)2 pl (δ − w)), or in both H+ and L+ information
sets (and get p2
(
p2hδ − c
)
+ p (1− p)β (phplδ − c)). However, it is easy to show that the first expression
is always larger in the region of interest where c ∈ [plp¯δ, plphδ]
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behaves optimally as it is not profitable for him to deviate and send an offer to different
matches even if one of agents deviates with him.
Proof. Claim 2.9 . In the first equilibrium where all agents collaborate indirectly
the total welfare is the sum of expected payoffs of two agents and an intermediary.
W1 = 2p¯ (δ − w) + 2p¯ (w − δ (1− p¯)) = 2p¯2δ10. As it is stated in Theorem2.3 a no
intermediary equilibrium is the one where high types always want to collaborate and
low types want to do it with positive probability. The total welfare here is the sum of
expected payoff of both agents. W2 = 2p2(ph−pl)2cδ(c−pl2δ) . As
∂W2
∂c < 0 and c ∈ [plp¯δ; phplδ]
W2 ≤ 2p (ph− pl) δp¯ < W1.
Proof. Theorem2.11.It is clear that indeed setting w˜∗ and working with corresponding
matches is an equilibrium. Here intermediary gets the highest expected payoff. If he
deviates to another wage, even in case the intermediary equilibrium is played after the
deviation, his expected payoff is lower.
Now, let me show that there is no other equilibrium11. If there is some different equilib-
rium if intermediary deviates to w˜∗ he knows that there can be only two continuation
equilibria one of them being No Intermediary Equilibrium, which is Pareto inferior.
Therefore, if he works with different subset of matches, he can deviate and set w˜∗ and
get higher expected payoff, as this wage corresponds to the equilibrium where he gets
the highest expected payoff. If he already works with preferred subset of types but sets
w < w˜∗ he can increase his wage and get higher payoff, as his expected payoff is an
increasing function of wage.
10Where p¯ = pph + (1− p) pl
11It is important that even though both w∗, w∗LL ∈ [1− pl, δ] regions for existence of these two
different equilibrium do not intersect (LL /∈ CE (w∗, c) and All /∈ CE (w∗LL, c)).
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3.1 Introduction
An important issue in economic theory is how to align incentives of workers in organiza-
tions with incentives of the principals. Due to simplicity of implementation tournaments
(a payment scheme that is based on the rank of the agents rather on their performance)
are extensively used2. Performance evaluation schemes (such as tournaments) are widely
used by the companies. Some corporations (for example Microsoft) use “sticky tanking”
to evaluate their employers. In this system their performance is allocated to one of the
groups, e.g. “excellent”, “good”, “average”, “poor”, “very poor” etc. Sometimes this
scheme provides the base for bonus payouts (and actually links them to individual per-
formance). Sometimes the reward people are competing for is the promotion, sometimes
it can mix of the benefits, and it might be even recognition3.
Tournaments have been widely studied in economic literature. While majority of re-
search concentrated on tournaments with a single prize, there is also important work
done on multiple-prize tournament. For example,Moldovanu et. al. [21, 22] have papers
on optimal prize allocation in the contests. They find that with linear cost function it
is optimal for designer to allocate the whole prize sum to the winner.
One concern that is important for the tournaments is that they can be subject to sab-
otage. There are several papers that look at tournaments with sabotage. For example,
Chen in [4] looks at one-period model where players can make productive efforts, or
can make destructive efforts towards their colleagues. He finds that able agents are
more likely to be subject to sabotage attacks. Also, due to sabotage activities the most
talented agents might not have the highest chance to be promoted. Similar problem
is analyzed by Munster in [24]. He also finds that talented agents are sabotaged more
heavily, and that sabotage equalizes the probability of promotion for agents of different
characteristics. Gurtler in [11] looks at the dynamic sabotage game with psychic cost of
being sabotaged. Due to these costs it might be optimal for talented agents in the first
period to actually help others and sabotage themselves.
Unlike the previous works mentioned Amegashie et. al. [1] consider dynamic contests
with sabotage where players can sabotage not the current rivals but those they might
meet in the future. Contestants are divided into two semi-finals, and they can help
player from another semifinals. They find that there is an equilibrium where only the
most able player engages in sabotage, which is a surprising result, as usually it is the
most talented agent who suffers most from being sabotaged by others.
2See for example Lazear and Rosen [16] for discussion.
3http://vimeo.com/97045946
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Another strand of literature on contests with sabotage is experimental one. For example,
Carpenter et. al. [3] conducts a real-effort experiment, where participants could sabotage
their contestants. They found that players actually provided less effort because they
anticipated to be victims of sabotage. In other works by Harbring et.al. [13],[12] authors
divide players into three types according to the cost of the effort: favorites, normals,
underdogs. They find that sabotage behavior varies with the composition of types
of players - for example, underdogs sabotaged favorites less in the contest with more
favorites. Another finding is that sabotage decreases if saboteurs identity is revealed.
Given this concern about the tournaments it is worth looking how presence of sabo-
tage changes the result of optimal prize allocation for the tournament designer. Even
intuitively it seems that giving all the prize to the winner will create high incentives to
sabotage. So, it might be optimal for the principal to provide positive prizes also to
those who have lost in the tournament. The result also should depend on the number
of participants in a contest. With more than two players sabotage becomes a public
good, which can undermine incentives to sabotage, and make it a lesser concern for the
designer.
Many of the real-world contests have multiple prizes, where not exclusively the winner
gets positive prize. For example, majority of sports contests award gold, silver and
bronze; in tender contests the second ranked firm can still be used as a back-up supplier;
in labor market several workers can be promoted.
I find that in continuous case with multiple prizes the optimal solution crucially depends
on the cost of sabotage. If sabotage is expensive designer wants to give all the prize to
the winner just like in classical no-sabotage case. However, when sabotage is cheap he
does not want to make a contest at all. Remarkably, we observe companies giving away
the “forced-ranking” reward scheme. For example, Microsoft got rid of “stack ranking”
in 20134.
4www.businessinsider.com/microsoft-just-killed-its-controversial-stack-ranking-employee-review-
system-2013-11
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3.2 Example
I start with the simple example that provides the main intuition. Principal decides on
two non negative prizes V1 and V2 that he distributes between two contestants. The
winner of the contest gets V1, another player gets V2, in case of the same result each
one gets V1+V22 . Agents can choose effort level e ∈ {0, 1}. However, unlike standard
model, they can also sabotage the outcome of their opponent by making a distructive
effort d ∈ {0, 1}. The principal does not observe neither the productive effort, nor
the sabotage agents have made. Instead for each agent i he observes the effort net of
sabotage e˜i = ei− dj , and he distributes prizes according to e˜i - the agent with highest
e˜i gets the first prize V1, another agent gets V2.
Agents can be of two types - either high or low (Θ = {H, L}). The type of the agent
determines the costs of productive effort - for high types it is ah, and for low types it is
al > ah (it is easier for high type agents to produce). The sabotage activity is also costly
and costs as, where ah < as < al. Therefore, it is cheaper for low type to sabotage,
while for high type it is cheaper to make a production effort. The cost of sabotage does
not depend on the type.
The principal wants to maximize the sum of expected net efforts (E(e˜1 + e˜2)) given that
the sum of prizes equals to the budget available for the principal, V1 + V2 = P .
3.2.1 No sabotage baseline
In case there is no sabotage possibility the optimal prize allocation result is just as
predicted by the classical result on optimal prize structure.
I am looking for PBE s : Θ → e. Here
(
eh
el
)
means that high type agent chooses
effort level eh, while low type agent chooses el.
2V2al 2ah
The picture shows which equilibrium will be played for different relationships between
V1 and V2.
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Claim 3.1. Without sabotage the optimal prize scheme assumes that the principal gives
not more that V1 − 2al to the loosing individual.
Proof. The first best outcome for the principal is to guarantee that both types make
efforts. In that case the expected payoff for high type agent is V1+V22 − ah, and the
expected payoff for low type agent is V1+V22 −al. The first best outcome can be supported
as an equilibrium if low type does not want to deviate and get V2 instead. Therefore, the
following inequality should be satisfied: V1+V22 − al ≥ V2. This brings us the restriction
on V2 that V2 ≤ V1 − 2al.
We see that for the principal it’s optimal to make V2 really low compared to V1 (V2 ≤
V1 − 2al) which is just in line with the result of [21]. In this case solutions contains the
case V1 = P , and V2 = 0. So, in the absence of sabotage it is optimal for the principal
to give the whole prize sum to the winner, as this will allow principal to achieve the
first-best outcome, where both types make effort.
So, here I get the standard optimal prize allocation results but applied to discrete case.
The first best equilibrium can be supported by a set of values of V1 and V2 that imply
the winner getting high reward, including the case where V1 = P , and V2 = 0. This is
intuitive as in the absence of sabotage there is no need to make high second-prize as It
will only increase incentive to shirk.
3.2.2 Sabotage case
Now I assume that players can make both productive and distructive efforts. I look for
the equilibrium of the form s : Θ → e × d. I denote a strategy by

eh
dh
el
dl
 where eh
represents the productive effort of a high type agent, dh is the destructive effort of high
type agent, el is the productive effort of a low type agent, and dl is a destructive effort
of low type agent.
Claim 3.2. When sabotage is possible principal can not achieve first-best outcome where
both types make productive effort and do not sabotage.
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Proof. The first-best result for the principal is when agents are playing the strategies
1
0
1
0
. However, this strategy profile can not be an equilibrium because there exists a
profitable deviation. When playing si =

1
0
1
0
, agents receive expected payoff EUi =
V1+V2
2 − pah − (1 − p)al. If an agent deviates to s′i =

1
0
0
1
 he gets expected payoff of
EU ′i =
V1+V2
2 − pah − (1− p)as > EUi = V1+V22 − pah − (1− p)al as as < al . Therefore,
it’s not possible achieve a first-best when sabotage is possible.
Now, the principal does not want to make V2 very low with respect to V1 as this induces
high incentives to sabotage from both types of agents. While first-best outcome is not
possible in this circumstances, the principal still can guarantee the second-best outcome.
Claim 3.3. The principal can achieve the second-best outcome where high type makes
productive effort while low type at least does not sabotages when V2 ∈ [V1 − 2as; V1 − 2ah]
Proof. The strategy profile s∗i =

1
0
0
0
 constitutes an equilibrium when there’s no prof-
itable deviation. The expected payoff is EUi(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) = p[p
V1+V2
2 + (1−p)V1−ah] + (1−
p)[pV2 + (1− p)V1+V22 ]. This strategy profile is an equilibrium if there are no profitable
deviations. Potential strategies, where one can deviate are s′i =

1
1
0
0
, s′′i =

1
0
0
1
,
s′′′i =

0
0
0
0
 . EUi(s′i, s−i) = p[V1− ah− as] + (1− p)[pV2 + (1− p)V1+V22 ], this deviation
is not profitable when V2 ≥ V1 − 2asp . EUi(s′′i , s−i) = p[pV1+V22 + (1− p)V1 − ah] + (1−
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p)[pV1+V22 + (1− p)V1− as], this deviation is non profitable when V2 ≥ V1− 2as. Finally,
EUi(s
′′′
i , s−i) = p[pV2 + (1− p)V1+V22 ] + (1− p)[pV2 + (1− p)V1+V22 ], this is unprofitable
when V2 ≤ V1 − 2ah. Combining all inequalities we get that the principal can reach the
second-best when V2 ∈ [V1 − 2as; V1 − 2ah].
The relationship between the V1 and V2 defines the equilibria played in a following
manner:
max      min
V
1
-2a
h
-2a
s 
    V
1
-2a
h  
         
 
2a
s 
               V
1
-2a
s
           V
1
-2a
h 2
V
1                    1                1          1       1             0
1                    1                1          0       0             0
1                    0                0          0       0             0
1                    1                0          1       0             0
1-p
V
1
-
So, we see that for the principal it is optimal to set V2 ∈ [V1 − 2as; V1 − 2ah]. This
prize distribution results in equilibrium where only high type agent makes an effort. It
is impossible for the principal to induce the low type agent to exert a productive effort
without any destructive effort.
This example shows that given the presence of sabotage it is optimal for the principal
to provide also the positive price for the second comer so that low type agents does not
have incentive to sabotage their partners.
3.2.3 N-player case with private information
Now suppose that there are N ≥ 3 players that compete in a contest. Principal dis-
tributes N prizes V1, V2... VN . First I consider the private information case - where each
contestant only knows his type and does not know types of other contestants. Principal
has no information about the types. With this information structure for each contes-
tants others look exactly the same because their types are not known and only a priori
distribution is known.
Now there is a possibility for different sabotage protocols: either by d = 1 an agent can
sabotage all other players at the same time simultaneously (I call this mass sabotage
protocol) or he has to choose one individual and sabotage this particular individual
without harming others (this is individual sabotage protocol).
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With individual sabotage protocol destructive effort acts as a public good (or in this
case more “public bad”), therefore one could expect to see less sabotage in equilibrium
as agents would want to free-ride on others. Therefore, a principal may be less worried
about the sabotage possibility and may again want to give majority of the prize sum to
the winner (to go back to the prize scheme that is optimal in the absence of sabotage).
Now the principal has to distribute N prizes V1, V2 ... VN , where V1 goes to the agent
with the highest observed outcome e˜i, V2 to the agent with the second outcome, and so
on. Finally, VN goes to the agent with the poorest performance.
3.2.3.1 Mass sabotage protocol
In case of mass sabotage individual can harm all his colleagues simultaneously. In this
case sabotage takes more the form of cheating. By making a sabotage decision of d = 1
harms all other players at the same time. Here the result will be similar to two-player
case. The principal can not achieve the first-best equilibrium, but he can guarantee the
second-best one where high type makes a productive effort and the low type at least
does not sabotages.
Claim 3.4. In a contest with N ≥ 3 players and mass sabotage protocol principal can
not achieve first best where both types work and nobody sabotages.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium where s∗i =

1
0
1
0
(so that e∗h = e∗l = 1, and
d∗h = d
∗
l = 0). The expected payoff in this equilibrium would be
EU(s∗i , s
∗
−i) = p[
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − ah] + (1− p)[
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − al].
Then a player can switch to a strategy s′ =

1
0
0
1
, where el = 0, and dl = 1, and get
EU
(
s′i, s
∗
−i
)
= p[
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − ah] + (1− p)[
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − as] > EUL(s∗i , s∗−i)
as as < al.
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Claim 3.5. The principal can achieve the second-best outcome, where high type makes
an effort, and low type does not sabotages. He does so by giving at least some part of
his budget to second and third prizes. The restriction on the relationship between V1
and V2, V3...VN are of the form α1V1 ≤ α0 +
∑N
i=2 αiVi, where α1 > 0.
Proof. The strategy profile s∗i =

1
0
0
0
 constitutes an equilibrium when there are no
profitable deviations. Expected payoff from playing this strategy profile is
EU(s∗i , s
∗
−i) = pEUH(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) + (1− p)EUL(s∗i , s∗−i) = p[
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−
p)k
∑N−k
i=1 Vi
N−k − ah] + (1− p)[
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1− p)k
∑N
i=N−k Vi
k+1 ],
where the first part is the expected payoff of being a high type while the second part
is the expected payoff of being the low type. Again I am checking for three alterna-
tive strategies that can be potentially profitable deviations: s′i =

1
1
0
0
, s′′i =

1
0
0
1
,
s′′′i =

0
0
0
0
 . The intuition for considering these particular strategies is that high type
has two potential deviations - he can either sabotage additionally to working or he can
neither work nor sabotage. It is not profitable for a high type to switch to sabotage
instead of productive effort as sabotage is more expensive for him. Respectively, for
low type there is only one potential deviation - where he sabotages. Low type will not
deviate to just working as working is more expensive for him. Neither should we con-
sider possible deviation where he works and sabotages at the same time as these two
activities for low type are more expensive than for high type, therefore, we should get
respective restrictions from no-deviation condition for high type. Out of these potential
three deviations two involve one type sabotaging (high type in s′ and low type in s′′)
and precisely from these two deviations I will get restrictions on V1.
EU(s′i, s
∗
−i) = pEUH(s
′
i, s
∗
−i) + (1− p)EUL(s′i, s∗−i) =
p[V1 − ah − as] + (1− p)[
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1− p)k
∑N
N−k Vi
k+1 ].
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This deviation is non-profitable when
V1(1−
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
N−k ) ≤ as +
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k∑N−ki=2 Vi
N−k .
This is the first inequality that gives us the restriction on V 1.
Coefficient in front of V1is greater than zero. Indeed, (1−
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
N−k ) >
(1−∑N−1k=0 ( N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1− p)k) = (1− (p+ (1− p))N = 0.
EU(s′′i , s
∗
−i) = pEUH(s
′′
i , s
∗
−i) + (1 − p)EUL(s′′i , s∗−i) = p[
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1 −
p)k
∑N−k
i=1 Vi
N−k −ah]+(1−p)[
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
∑N−k
i=1 Vi
N−k −as]. This is not prof-
itable when
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1− p)k
∑N−k
i=1 Vi
N−k − as ≤
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−
p)k
∑N
i=N−k Vi
k+1 . Rearranging the terms we get limitation on V1: V1(
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
N−k −
(1−p)(N−1)
N ) ≤ as+
∑N
i=2 Vi(
∑N−2
k=N−i
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
k+1 +
(1−p)N−1
N −
∑N−i
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−
p)k). This is the second inequality that gives us restrictions on V1. Coefficient in front
of V1 is larger than zero, as
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
N−k − (1−p)
(N−1)
N ≥ (p+(1−p))
(N−1)
N −
(1−p)(N−1)
N > 0. Sign in front of any Vi ∈ {V2, V3...VN} is determined by
βi =
∑N−2
k=N−i
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
k+1 +
(1−p)N−1
N −
∑N−i
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1− p)k. Here,
the first two pars represent the probability of winning respective Vi when being a low
type, while the last part represents the probability of winning Vi when being a high type.
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Therefore, we get two restrictions on V1that should be satisfied simultaneously - V1|
V1(1−
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
N−k ) ≤ as +
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k∑N−ki=2 Vi
N−k
V1(
∑N−1
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
N−k − (1−p)
(N−1)
N ) ≤ as +
∑N
i=2 Vi(
∑N−2
k=N−i
(
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
k+1 +
(1−p)N−1
N −
∑N−i
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1− p)k)
So, the final restriction on V1 indeed has the form α1V1 ≤ α0 +
∑N
i=2 αiVi, where α1 > 0.
3.2.3.2 Individual sabotage protocol
In the case of individual sabotage protocol N agents I should also specify how players
sabotage. I assume that a player sabotages one opponent by choosing d ∈ {0, 1}. I look
for the symmetric PBE of the same form as before. Each agent chooses a productive
effort e ∈ {0, 1} and destructive effort d ∈ {0, 1}. When a player decides to make a
destructive effort he chooses at random which one of opponents will be sabotaged.
First I look under which conditions there exist such a combination of {V1, V2...VN} where
a principal can guarantee first-best outcome (both types make only productive efforts
and do not sabotage at all). I again assume that in case of equal outcomes agents share
the sum of relevant prizes. For example if all agents ended with the same e˜ they share the
sum of N prizes among each other, while if N−1 agents have the same observed outcome
they share either (V1 + V2 + ...+VN−1) or (V2 + V3 + ...+ VN )depending on weather they
are leaders or followers.
When this first-best strategy profile is an equilibrium the expected payoff of players is
EU (s∗) = p(
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − ah) + (1− p)(
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − al). As all agents make the same amount
of effort in equilibrium they are correctly expecting to end up with the same e˜i and
therefore to share the prize sum.
Claim 3.6. The strategy profile s∗ = {eH = 1, dH = 0, eL = 1, dL = 0}3 consti-
tutes a symmetric PBE in the game described above if{V1, V2, V3} satisfy the following
inequalities:
(1)
∑N−1
i=1
Vi
(N−1) − VN ≤ Nas
(2)
∑N
i=1 Vi − (N−2)(VN+VN−1)2 ≥ N(aL − as)
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(3)
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − VN ≥ aL
Proof. In order for s∗ = {eH = 1, dH = 0, eL = 1, dL = 0}N to be a symmetric
PBE we should ensure that there are no profitable deviations. There are three possible
deviations from s∗ for each type (to make effort and sabotage; just to sabotage; and
not to make neither effort nor sabotage). Combination of prizes where none of these
deviations is profitable determines the set of {V1, V2,..., VN} where s∗ is an equilibrium
strategy profile.
I argue that only three deviations are binding in determining the domain where equilib-
rium exists: 1) any type deviates to make both productive effort and sabotage; 2) the
low type thinks about switching to eL = 0 and dL,= 1; and 3) the low type wants to
switch to eL = 0, and dL = 0.
First, the deviation to both productive effort and sabotage brings the same no-deviation
condition for both types:
∑N
i=1 Vi
N ≥
∑N−1
i=1 Vi
N−1 − as. Rearranging, we get condition∑N−1
i=1
Vi
N(N−1) − VNN ≤ as. This gives us the restriction on {V1, V2...VN−1}.
High type never wants to deviate to eH = 0, dL = 1 as sabotage for him is more costly
and less efficient. However, low type can be tempted to deviate. In that case he will get
VN+VN−1
2 −as. No-deviation condition requires that VN+VN−12 −as ≤
∑N
i=1 Vi
N −aL, which
is equal to
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − (N−2)(VN+VN−1)2N ≥ aL − as. This gives restriction on VN and VN−1.
Finally, as effort is more expensive for low type he has more incentive to deviate to no
work/no sabotage profile This deviation brings to him the payoff of VN , therefore, the
binding condition for this deviation not to be profitable is
∑N
i=1 Vi
N − aL ≥ VN . This
condition gives us restriction on VN .
Rearranging the first and third inequalities we get:
(1) VN ≥
∑N−1
i=1
Vi
(N−1) −Nas
(3) VN ≤
∑N−1
i=1
Vi
(N−1) − NaLN−1
This inequalities immediately show that s∗ can be an equilibrium profile only if (N −
1)as ≥ aL. It is a necessary condition for s∗ to be an equilibrium.
The next question I am addressing is when this equilibrium can be supported by giving
all the prize sum to the winner (V1 = S, V2 = ... = VN = 0). It turns out that this is
possible when S ≤ N(N − 1)as, S ≥ N(aL − as), and S ≥ NaL, where S is the prize
sum. So the first-best equilibrium can be supported by giving all the prize to the winner
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when S ∈ [NaL; N(N − 1)as]. If the prize sum does not lie in this region the first-best
equilibrium assumes that the winner does not get the whole prize sum.
If the first-best outcome can not be achieved, for example when sabotage is relatively
cheap ((N − 1)as ≥ aL) the best option for the principal is the second-best outcome.
As I’ve mentioned before the second-best outcome is when high type agent makes only
productive effort, while the low type agent makes no efforts at all - neither productive
nor distructive. I want to find for which combination of prizes this strategy profile
constitutes an equilibrium.
In this case the high type agent has an expected payoff of EUH =
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−
p)k
∑N−k
i=1 Vi
N−k −ah. The low type agent has EUL =
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k
∑N
i=N−k Vi
k+1 ].
High type can deviate to a strategy profile where he makes both productive and sabo-
tage effort, or to a strategy profile where he does not make any effort at all. Low type
agent can deviate to a strategy profile where he can either make a sabotage effort, or to
a strategy profile where he makes both types of efforts. These four conditions make the
restriction on V1, V2,...,VN space where the desirable strategy profile is supported as an
equilibrium.
Claim 3.7. When (N −1)as ≥ aL the principal can only guarantee second-best outcome
where high type agent works, while low-type agent does not work and does not sabotage.
He can guarantee this outcome by setting V1, V2...VN that satisfy following inequalities:
Proof. If a low type deviates to a profile where he sabotages he gets the following ex-
pected payoff: EUL =
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k(N−k−1N−1
∑N
i=N−k−1 Vi
k+2 +
k
N−1
∑N−1
i=N−k Vi
k )−
as. The deviation is not profitable when
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1−p)k(N−k−1N−1
∑N
i=N−k−1 Vi
k+2 +
k
N−1
∑N−1
i=N−k Vi
k ) − as ≤
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1 − p)k
∑N
i=N−k Vi
k+1 . Rearranging I get∑N−1
i=1 αiVi+αNVN ≤ as, where ai = (C(N − 1, N − i− 1)pi(1−p)N−i−1 i(N−1)(N−i+1) +∑N−1
k=N−iC(N−1, k)pN−1−k(1−p)k( N+1(N−1)(k+2)− 1k+1)), and aN =
∑N−1
k=0 C(N−1, k)pN−1−k(1−
p)k( N−k−1(N−1)(k+2) − 1k+1). We see that α1 > 0, so that this inequality always restricts V1.
For other coefficients it’s also possible to make several statements. The coefficient αi > 0
if 2k > N − 3. This will always be the case when i < N+32 . So, this inequality restricts
at least first N+32 prizes. For example, when N = 3 it actually means restriction on both
V1and V2, while when N rises at least
N
2 prizes should be restricted from above.
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If a low type deviates to a profile where he both sabotages and makes productive effort
he gets the following expected payoff:
EUL =
∑N−1
k=0 (
N − 1
k
)pN−1−k(1− p)k(N−k−1N−1
∑N−k−1
i=1 Vi
N−k−1 +
k
N−1
∑N−k
i=1 Vi
N−k )−as−al. This
deviation is not profitable when
∑N−1
i=1 γiVi− γNVN ≤ as + al, where γi =
∑N−i
k=0 C(N −
1, k)pN−1−k(1− p)k( k(N−1)(N−k) + 1N−1)−
∑N−1
k=N−iC(N − 1, k)pN−1−k(1− p)k 1k+1 , and
γN =
∑N−1
k=0 C(N − 1, k)pN−1−k (1−p)
k
k+1 . We can see easily that γ1 > 0 therefore this
inequality restricts V1.
If a high type deviates to a profile where he both works and sabotages then we get again
the inequality of the form
∑N−1
i=1 γiVi−γ′NVN ≤ as, where γi are the same as in previous
case, while γ′N =
pN−1
N . As we have the same coefficient in front of V1 this inequality
also will restrict the first prize from the above.
Finally, if high type deviates to the profile where he neither makes productive effort
nor sabotages he we get the restriction of
∑N
i=1 δiVi ≥ ah, where δi =
∑N−i
k=0 C(N −
1, k)pN−k−1(1 − p)k 1N−k −
∑N−1
k=N−iC(N − 1, k)pN−k−1(1 − p)k 1k+1 . Here δ1 > 0, while
δN < 0, so this inequality restricts VN and (possibly) other prizes for loosers.
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3.3 Continuous cost case
3.3.1 Two agents
Now instead of looking at the case of discrete types I consider the case where costs are
distributed according to some distribution F [0, 1], and as ∈ [0, 1]. To simplify the
solution I assume now that the cost of productive effort ei for the type ai is
ei
ai
so that
for the agents with lowest a productive effort is the most costly. The cost of distructive
activity is dias where as is the cost of sabotage that is unique for all agents. I am looking
for equilibrium bidding strategies e (a), and d (a). Moreover, I look for equilibrium where
the sum of two γ (a) = e (a) + d (a) is monotone in a. I find that the optimal bidding
function is piecewise function:
γ∗ (a) = e∗ (a) , when a ≥ as
γ∗ (a) = d∗ (a) , when a < as
where d∗ (a) = (V1 − V2) as
∫ a
0 f (a) da, and e
∗ (a) = (V1 − V2)
∫ a
as
af (a) da+ d(as).
The designer chooses V1 and V2 in order to maximize−2
∫ as
0 d
∗ (a) f (a) da+2
∫ 1
as
e∗ (a) f (a) da.
Claim 3.8. When as > a¯s the optimal solution of the principal implies that principal
gives all the prize to the winner and when as ≤ a¯s the optimal solution implies that
principal sets V1 = V2.
Proof. The objective function of the principal is
W (as) = −2as (V1 − V2)
∫ as
0
(∫ a
0
f (x) dx
)
f (a) da+2 (V1 − V2)
∫ 1
as
(∫ a
as
xf (x) dx
)
f (a) da.
We can rewrite it as
W (as) = (V1 − V2) k (as, a)
If as = 0 then W (as) = 2 (V1 − V2)
∫ 1
0
(∫ a
0 af (a) da
)
f (a) da = (V1 − V2) k (0, a), where
k (0, a) > 0. Then principal would then want to set V1 = S, and V2 = 0, where S
is the total prize sum that principal wants to distribute. If as = 1 then W (as) =
−2as (V1 − V2)
∫ 1
0
(∫ a
0 f (a) da
)
f (a) da = − (V1 − V2) k (1, a), where k (1, a) > 0. Then
principal would like to set V1 = V2, not making any contest at all but instead dis-
tributing prizes equally. I argue that W (as) is monotone in as. The k (as, a) is
monotonically decreasing in as
dk
das
= −2(∫ as0 (∫ a0 f (a) da) f (a) da) + asF (as) f (as))−
asf (as) (1− F (as)) < 0. Therefore, k (as, a) is monotonically decreasing in as, and
k (0, a) > 0, while k (1, a) < 0. So, by intermediate value theorem ∃ some a¯s s.t.
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k (a¯s, a) = 0, while for as < a¯s k (as, a) > 0 and in order to maximize W the principal
will set V1 = S, and V2 = 0.
3.3.2 Multiple agents
Now I assume that there are N agents who compete for three prizes V1, V2... VN . I also
assume that cost is distributes uniformly: a ∼ U [0, 1].
3.3.2.1 Mass sabotage protocol
If sabotage follows mass protocol then when one agents chooses a sabotage level d (a)
he harms all other agents by this amount at the same time. The objective function of
an agent in this case is
N−1∑
i=0
ViC(N − 1, i)
(
γ−1 (e+ d)
)N−1−i (
1− γ−1 (e+ d))i − e
a
− d
as
→ max
e≥0, d≥0
.
Again optimal decisions of the agents take a form
γ∗ (a) = e∗ (a) , when a ≥ as
γ∗ (a) = d∗ (a) , when a < as
where
d∗ (a) = V1asaN−1 +as
∑N−2
i=1 Vi+1C(N−1, i)[(N−1−i)B(a,N−1−i, i+1)−iB(a,N−
i, i)] + VNas(1− a)N−1
e∗ (a) = e∗0 + c = V1aN
N−1
N +
∑N−2
i=1 Vi+1C(N − 1, i)[(N − 1 − i)B(a,N − i, i + 1) −
iB(a,N − i+ 1, i)]− VN (N − 1)B(a, 2, N − 1) + c,
where B(x, k, q) is a partial Beta-function.
For the case of N = 3 agents the optimal sabotage and effort functions will take the
following form:
d∗ (a) = asa
[
V1a+ 2V2 (1− a)− 2V3
(
1− a
2
)]
e∗ (a) = a2
[
2
3
V1a+ 2V2
(
1
2
− 2
3
a
)
− 2V3
(
1
2
− a
3
)]
+ c.
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We can see that V1, and V2 have positive influence on both productive effort and sabo-
tage, while V3, has negative influence on both types of efforts.
The constant c is found from d∗ (as) = e∗ (as) and it is equal to
c = a2s
(
1
3V1as + 2V2
(
1
2 − 13as
)− 2V3 (12 − as6 )).
The objective function of the principal is
W (as) = −3
∫ as
0
d∗ (a) da+ 3
∫ 1
as
e∗ (a) da→ max
V1, V2, V3
We can rewrite it as W (as) = V1k1 + V2k2 + V3k3, where k1 =
1
6 +
a3s
3 − 56a4s, k2 =
a2s
(
1− 3as + 53a2s
)
, k3 = −16 − a2s + 83a3s − 56a4s, so the objective function of the principal
is linear in prizes (just like in [21]). If as = 0, which corresponds to sabotage being
infinitely costly, k1 =
1
6 , k2 = 0, k3 = −16 , and the principal should give the whole prize
sum to the winner. In contrast, if as = 1 meaning that sabotage is very cheap k1 = −13 ,
k2 = −13 , k3 = 23 .
We also observe that the second prize will always have lower impact on the principal
objective function than the first prize, however relationships with the third prize depend
on as.
In this case the optimal decision of the principal will also have a form of bang-bang
solution:
V1 = S, V2 = V3, when as ≤ a¯s
V1 = V2 = V3, when as > a¯s
,where a¯s ≈ 0.7.
So, when the cost of sabotage is below a¯s(which means that sabotage is expensive) the
principal will indeed want to distribute all the prize to the winner. However, once the cost
of the sabotage surpasses a¯she does not want to make the contest at all, and distributes
prizes equally between participants. In that case too many types too sabotage, and the
damage of sabotage would overweight for the principal the gains of effort.
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3.4 Conclusions
I find that in the presence of sabotage can change substantially the optimal allocation
of the prizes in a contest. The scheme where all sum is allocated to the winner may be
not optimal anymore because it creates very high sabotage incentives.
This indeed happens for the case of two agents. Here, principal optimally also gives a
substantial reward for the looser so that to discourage latter for sabotaging. Such prize
allocation allows principal to achieve second best.
In case of more than two agents sabotage may or may not be bit concern depending on
the sabotage protocol. In cases of mass sabotage the result of two-agent case still holds.
However, the case of individual sabotage differs substantially as sabotage becomes a
public good. Desire of the players to free-ride on cost of sabotage can result (for high
sabotage cost) in first-best outcome being achieved again with a standard winner-gets-all
payment scheme.
Results become more extreme for continuous type distribution. For two players and
for three players with uniform distribution the decision of a principal has a form of a
”bang-bang” solution - either principal gives all the prize to the winner when sabotage
is expensive or he does not want to make a contest at all when sabotage is cheap.
This provides a very important insight that a contest might not be attractive at all when
sabotage is very easy.
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4.1 Introduction
Game theory courses now constitute an essential part of education in both economics and
business. They teach students main concepts but also introduce them to that particular
way of thinking, teach to take into account strategies of other players and to view the
game as it is for other counterparts.
In our paper we wanted to analyze to what extent the fact that one is accustomed
with game theoretical tools alternates persons’ behavior and in particular the decisions
made while playing prisoners dilemma. We wondered if those who knew game theory
behave systematically more selfish and less cooperative. We also asked ourselves if these
potential differences in behavior were present only in some circumstances and not in
others (e.g. when playing against computer, or random partner, and not when playing
with a well-known people). To address these questions we have conducted classroom
experiments where students were playing Prisoners Dilemma. To find the source of
changed behavior we conducted different treatments.
It is important to know the influence of studying game theory on students’ behavior for
the purpose of teaching economics. Moreover, this is a useful insight for experimental
economics as it helps to plan better the sample of participants and to know the potential
differences between players with different course backgrounds.
Our experiment shows that indeed there is a huge difference in results before and after
the course. However our experiment suggests that players behave less cooperatively
not because of the knowledge of game theory per se, but because they know that their
opponents are accustomed to game theory and this alters their expectations.
We’ve also found that before the course players only took into account their own informa-
tion about the game while after the course they have considered both their information
and that of their partner which shows that their level of reasoning has increased. We’ve
also seen that when two partners in a group were endowed with different information (one
had knowledge on the partners identity while another didn’t have) those who had more
information were especially cooperative, while those who had less information behaved
in especially individualistic manner.
Finally, after the course we have also found gender differences in expectations in random
treatment, which in turn caused the difference in played strategies between male and
female players. While female participants were expecting their partner to defect, males
expected only cooperation.
To sum up our results, we’ve found that after the course of game theory students increase
their level of reasoning and behave significatly less cooperatively because they expect
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their opponents to defect; this is especially female students when playing with a random
partner.
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4.2 Literature
There are several strands of literature that are relevant to our work.
Classroom experiments have been extensively used in economics due to their relative
simplicity and accessibility. Mostly papers investigate the influence of classroom exper-
iments techniques on the learning process - e.g. Holt ([14]). There are not so many
classroom experiment on classical prisoners dilemma though.
There are several works on the effect of studying economics. Marwell et. al. [18] con-
ducted a public good experiment and have found that economists contribute significantly
less (around 20% for economists compared to around 40% for other disciplines). How-
ever, in their study Isaac et. al. [17] have not found any differences in contributions
between economists and sociologists when the game was repeated and non-discrete with
respect to contribution levels.
Frank et. al. in [6] look at the connection between being an economist and cooperation.
Authors have conducted a survey on charity donation for different faculty and have
found that professional economist donate less. They also perform the prisoners dilemma
game between students of different backgrounds that also show that economists tend
to defect more. The authors comment a bit on the self-selection issue that initially
more self-interested people may be more appealed towards economics. They also point
the substantial gender differences in their study showing that male participants behave
less cooperatively. The authors comment on potential importance of beliefs differences
between economists and non-economists but do not elicit beliefs explicitly in their ex-
periment.
Unlike the work of Frank et. al. [6] Yezer et.al. [32] argue that while economists may
behave selfishly when playing hypothetical games or responding to surveys, in real-world
they still cooperate a lot. The authors create a”lost-letters” experiment where letters
with cash were left in different classrooms. The results show that economist students
return the letters significantly more often than students of other disciplines.
Frank et. al. [7] address the concern raised by Yezer et. al. [32] by explaining that their
claim concerned mainly behavior in social dilemmas. Authors still argue that in social
dilemmas economist students are marginally less cooperative. They place some doubt
on the accuracy of results of Yezer et. al. [32] and outline that several social dilemma
experiments still have shown significantly less cooperation by economists.
Ferraro in [5] argues that economic theories shape the day-to-day institutions, social
norms and language, and therefore become self-fulfilling. The authors cite the evidence
that self-interest is a learned behavior.
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One of the closest papers to what we are doing is the one by Rubinstein [26]. The
author has made his students play some preclass online games before the course on game
theory and after the course. He played various games to test different game-theoretical
concepts and have found that there does not seem to be any substantial difference in
how students behave before and after the course. However unlike our experiment in the
work of Rubinstein [26] the choices were hypothetical (there were no prizes associated
with them), and the Prisoners Dilemma was present only in a dynamic version.
The paper of Byrnes et. al. [2] looks at the differences in risk-attitude between men
and women. This is relevant for our research as we have found gender particularities in
behavior and differences in risk attitude might be a potential explanation. In the paper
authors conduct a meta-analysis of 150 studies where risk-attitudes of males and females
were measured. They have found that for almost all types of risk behaviour there was a
significant gender differences with males being more risk-taking.
In our research we concentrated on the influence of game theory on the behavior of
the students. While being partially linked to economic concepts (and applied to many
of them) game theory can alter performance in a particular manner. Game theory
teaches students to think strategically, to see the game also through the opponents eyes
and to best respond to the opponents strategies. In our experiment we were especially
interested in the reasons for the change in behavior. We’ve conducted different treatment
to distinguish between potential mechanisms of the influence of game theory course.
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4.3 Experiment
We’ve conducted series of classroom experiments on students at ESC-Rennes (Ecole
Superieure de Commerce in Rennes). The students were a part of our class on Mi-
croeconomics. This course was taught at the PGE2 program (equivalent to the end of
undergraduate/beginning of master programs). Students were business students and
this was the first course on economics they’ve ever had, neither had they before any
game theory course. We’ve played the prisoners dilemma game in the class before and
after studying the game theory. We have also conducted different treatments both before
and after experiments.
We formulated our prisoners dilemma as a story and we kept the context. Our idea was
that for those who are not accustomed with either game theory or even mathematical
way of thinking it is easier to follow the game in a context. In every class the winner (or
a random draw from the set of winners when there were several of them) was rewarded
with the prize. Students applauded to the prizes and were very enthusiastic which
confirms that those prizes provided enough incentives for them. In the treatment with
belief elicitation each correct belief guess was awarded with a chocolate.
We have 199 students who played the game in the beginning of the course who were
divided into 9 groups. Out of them 3 groups were of stranger matching protocol where
each player was randomly matched with someone and didn’t know with whom he was
playing. Two groups were of partner matching protocol, where both participants in the
pair knew exactly with whom they were playing. Three groups were of half stranger/half
partner matching: in each pair one player knew his partner, while another player in the
pair didn’t know the partner. Finally, one group played against computer.
There were 226 students in the experiment after game theory course who were divided
into 10 groups3. Out of them three groups were playing random treatment (paired with
strangers), two groups were playing partner matching, three groups were playing half
random/half partner with only one in the pair having full knowledge, and two groups
were playing against the computer. Moreover, one group in each of the treatments
(random, partner, half random/half partner, computer) was playing with a modified
payoff table and modified story. While it was still prisoners dilemma in its nature,
it was presented now as a duopoly story. We also had one random treatment where
experiment was not performed by a class teacher but by other person. This treatment
addressed the concern that in classroom experiments students might just want to please
3This were the same students are before the course. There were some students who only participated
before or after due to their presence in the class
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the teacher and behave accordingly. Finally, in one of the random treatments we’ve
elicited beliefs after the main decision was made.
We have also included the data on the gender of the players and on the final course score.
Gender variable allows us to check if indeed males are less cooperative, while score is a
proxy for student ability and dilience.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Before studying GT
We have four main treatments in our experiment that differ in the matchingprotocol:
random, partner, half random/half partner, and computer. Though, we were assigning
each treatment in a completely random fashion to different groups, we still want to check
that there was no potential selection of subjects, for example that one particular group
contains smarter students than other groups.
First we look at the average exam scores and gender for different treatments (see Figure
4.1). As we can see there does not seem to be any significant difference neither in the
exam grades nor in the gender between various treatment groups. We also perform a
test to confirm that treatment assignment was completely random.
Figure 4.1:
To compare our four treatments and show that they are similar with respect to the
students who participated we perform the one-way ANOVA test4. We compare if either
final score or gender is differently distributed in any of our treatments. For both variables
one-way ANOVA test rejects the hypothesis that the distribution is different between
treatments (see Appendix).
As our treatment assignments are indeed random we can proceed to the treatment effects
estimation. First, we investigate what happens before students learn game theory. The
results of a probit regression are presented in Table 4.1. We’ve checked several specifi-
cations and get robust results. We estimate the probability of defection (e.g. playing
Nash strategy) for four treatments, while computer treatment serves as a baseline. For
interpretational purposes we’ve divided half random/half partner treatment into two:
those who knew their partner (half partner), and those who didn’t (half random).
From here we already see that probability of defection is lower for all four treatment
in comparison to the computer one. Moreover, for partner and partner in half it is
4It allows to check that samples in multiple groups are drawn from populations with the same means
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Table 4.1: Before the Game Theory
(1) (2) (3) (4)
defection defection defection defection
defection
random -0.337 -0.335 -0.359 -0.356
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
partner -0.666∗∗ -0.685∗∗ -0.704∗∗ -0.705∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30)
partner in half -0.849∗∗ -0.709∗∗ -0.767∗∗ -0.755∗∗
(0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
random in half -0.253 -0.198 -0.206 -0.194
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
gender No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes
Observations 199 192 192 192
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
significantly lower. To get more detailed picture on the influence of different treatments
on defection we look at the marginal effects (Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Marginal effects of treatment before the Game Theory
(1) (2) (3) (4)
defection defection defection defection
computer 0.600 0.598 0.606 0.604
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
random 0.467 0.466 0.465 0.464
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
partner 0.340 0.332 0.333 0.331
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
partner in half 0.276 0.32 0.310 0.313
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
random in half 0.500 0.521 0.525 0.528
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
gender No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes
Observations 199 192 192 192
Standard errors in parentheses
We can see that we get robust marginal effects for different model specifications. The
highest probability of playing Nash strategy is found for the computer treatment (around
0.6). The second highest probability is for those not knowing their partner in half
random/half partner treatment (0.52), while for completely random treatment it’s a bit
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smaller (0.46). Finally, the most cooperative behavior is reported by partner treatment
and those playing a partner part in half random/half partner treatment (around 0.33
and 0.31 respectively). Based on this results we can divide our treatments in three
blocks - 1) computer, 2) where players didn’t know the partner (completely random
and half random), and 3) where players knew the partners (partner and half partner).
We see that playing against the real person (compared to playing against computer)
matters and creates higher incentives to cooperate. Knowing the partner ensures even
more cooperation. We can also observe that in the second block when participant is
informationally disadvantaged (in the half random treatment he does not know the
opponent, while opponent knows him) he tends to compensate it by slightly higher
probability of defection.
One important result we get is that before learning game theory only personal informa-
tion matters. Outcome of completely random and half random treatments are practically
identical; the same is true for complete partner or half partner treatments.
We also look at the marginal effects of the gender (Table 4.3). Male participants have
probability of 0.48 of defection, while for females it’s slightly lower (0.41). There is
indeed a difference but it’s not that big as was mentioned in some previous literature.
Table 4.3: Marginal effects of gender before the Game Theory
(1) (2)
defection defection
female 0.411 0.411
(0.05) (0.05)
male 0.480 0.480
(0.05) (0.05)
score No Yes
Observations 192 192
Standard errors in parentheses
4.4.2 After studying GT
It is not surprising that after having a course on Game Theory probability of defection
among students increased significantly. Figure 4.2 presents the defection probabilities
before and after.
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Figure 4.2:
Before only in 0.43 percents of the cases students played confess; after the figure has
risen to 0.7. As we are particularly interested in what stands behind it we look at the
dynamics of defection for every treatment.
Table 4.4 shows the probit regression for probability of defection after the course.
Table 4.4: After the Game Theory
(1) (2) (3) (4)
defection defection defection defection
defection
random 0.111 0.085 0.128 0.100
(0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)
partner 0.318 0.278 0.287 0.273
(0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
partner in half 0.034 0.078 0.112 0.080
(0.31) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
random in half 0.261 0.186 0.248 0.198
(0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
gender No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes
Observations 226 221 221 221
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We see that after the course for all the treatments the probability to play Nash strategy is
(insignificantly) higher compared to computer treatment. This is exactly the opposite of
what was going on before the course. So, whether you know your partner or are playing
with a random person the sole fact that your opponent is accustomed with game theory
increases your probability of defection.
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In Table 4.5 we see the marginal effects of treatments.
Table 4.5: Marginal effects of treatment after the Game Theory
(1) (2) (3) (4)
defection defection defection defection
computer 0.64 0.665 0.653 0.66
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
random 0.686 0.695 0.699 0.698
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
partner 0.755 0.758 0.752 0.755
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
partner in half 0.658 0.692 0.693 0.691
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
random in half 0.73 0.729 0.739 0.731
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
gender No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes
Observations 226 221 221 221
Standard errors in parentheses
So, we see that there is a substantial difference in how people play before and after game
theory. We want to distinguish to what extend this difference is attributed to the fact
that players are already accustomed with game and play it for the second time (the
game they’ve already studied during the course), and to what extend the difference is
due to knowing the concepts of game theory in general. Additionally, we want to trace
the framing effect we might have due to using PD story.
4.4.3 Modified story treatment
After the course we’ve had five groups out of eleven to play modified game. The new
game was essentially a PD but framed as an oligopoly story. In Table 4.6 we see the
result of probit regression for both modified games and original ones.
We can see immediately that results are different for modified and not modified game.
For not modified game the probability of defection is (insignificantly) higher for all
treatments (compared to computer baseline), while for modified game it is lower for half
partner treatment. In this sense it is a bit similar to before game theory situation for
the original game where half partner treatment had the lowest probability of defection.
In Table 4.7 we have marginal effects for modified and original games after the GT
course.
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Table 4.6: After the Game Theory
modified not modified
defection
random 0.000 0.209 0.231 0.401 0.131 0.059 0.081 0.042
(0.53) (0.57) (0.58) (0.60) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35)
partner 0.000 0.217 0.175 0.344 0.415 0.314 0.316 0.286
(0.55) (0.58) (0.58) (0.60) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
partner in half -0.727 -0.224 -0.222 -0.082 0.355 0.246 0.264 0.225
(0.59) (0.65) (0.65) (0.67) (0.37) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39)
random in half 0.067 0.204 0.350 0.440 0.355 0.238 0.262 0.214
(0.63) (0.65) (0.69) (0.70) (0.37) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39)
gender No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 77 74 74 74 149 147 147 147
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.7: Marginal effects after the Game Theory
modified not modified
computer 0.800 0.746 0.740 0.698 0.571 0.612 0.606 0.619
(0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
random 0.800 0.807 0.808 0.817 0.622 0.634 0.637 0.635
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
partner 0.800 0.809 0.793 0.802 0.724 0.725 0.721 0.722
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
partner in half 0.545 0.671 0.664 0.669 0.704 0.702 0.703 0.701
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
random in half 0.818 0.806 0.838 0.827 0.704 0.699 0.702 0.697
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
gender No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 77 74 74 74 149 147 147 147
We see again a difference between modified game and a not modified one. First of all,
defection probabilities in modified game are higher than in original game for all treat-
ments but half partner one. Therefore, we see that framing effect is indeed present, and
players indeed defect more when the game is framed as oligopoly rather than prisoners
dilemma. In modified game the defection probabilities for all treatments but half partner
are higher than in computer treatment (0.81 for random, 0.8 for partner, 0.82 for half
random compared to only 0.69 in computer). So, we observe that playing with a real
person matters, and it surprisingly leads to higher probability of playing Nash strategy
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and less cooperation. So, the sole fact that the partner is accustomed to game theory
rises expectations about defection and leads indeed to less cooperation.
In modified game there is substantially less defection by partners in half partner/half ran-
dom treatment. It can not be explained by social feelings (e.g. trust) because in partner
treatment (where both players know exactly with whom they are playing) players defect
much more (80% for both partner treatment vs. only 67% in half partner). We have
already observed the slight differences in behavior between informational advantageous
partners and disadvantageous randoms in half partner/half random treatment when we
analyzed the PD before game theory. There half partners were more cooperative than
partners in both partner treatment, and half randoms were less cooperative than ran-
doms in both random treatment. We have observed the same pattern in both modified
and unmodified games after the course, though with different magnitude. Those who
knew with whom they are playing while their partner did not were more cooperative
than those whose opponent shares their full knowledge (half partner vs. both partner).
Similarly, those who didn’t know their partner while the partner had this information
were more individualistic than those whose partner did not have any information either
(half random vs. both random).
Finally, there are some patterns in behavior when playing the game for the first time (PD
before game theory and modified game after) and when plying the game they’ve already
played before (PD after the course). In the games played for the first time defection in
random treatments (both random and randoms in half random/half partner) is higher
than in partner treatments (both partner and partners in half partner/half random).
While for the game already played this becomes reversed. The highest defection is seen
in both partner treatment where both players know with whom they are playing. The
magnitude of this differences in defection rate between random and partner treatments
also changes with players experience. When they had no knowledge about game theory
and about this particular game they were playing in random treatment players were
playing Nash 13 percent points more than in partner treatment. When playing a new
game (modified treatment) after learning game theory the difference in defection between
random and partner treatment became very small - only 1 percent point. However, when
playing a game they’ve already played after the course the whole situation becomes
reversed, and now in the partner treatment participants were playing Nash strategy 8
percent points more ofter than in random treatment. So, while before game theory social
feelings and trust played huge role for participants, after the course they were not as
important, and even playing with a known partner resulted in a higher defection when
the game was already played before.
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We also see that after the course for those who play PD defection probabilities in half
random and half partner treatments are practically the same (0.7) and this is a very
robust finding. Before the course these two probabilities were not so close, with half
random probability being closer to both random, while half partner performance was
closer to both partner. So, before GT behavior of the players just depended on the
information they had about their partner and not on what the opponent knew. However,
after the course the probabilities of half random and half partner treatments diverge
from subsequent probabilities of full treatment and converge to each other. So, after
the course when playing the familiar game both personal information and information
available to the opponent become equally relevant.
4.4.4 Other teacher treatment
Now we address the concern for classroom experiments that students might uncon-
sciously try to please their teacher and play accordingly. We have conducted one random
treatment where the experiment was performed by another person. Table 4.8 presents
the results of probit regression of the influence of the other teacher on the results.
Table 4.8: Other teacher treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
defection defection defection defection
defection
other teacher=1 0.161 0.175 0.070 0.201
(0.38) (0.40) (0.41) (0.44)
gender No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes
Observations 45 44 44 44
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We see that the influence of the other teacher on defection probability is (insignificantly)
positive. If our initial concern was correct this would suggest that with the usual teacher
students were playing more Nash while with the new teacher players should defect less.
However, the the data does not support this and suggests quite the opposite.
The marginal effects of other teacher are presented in the Table 4.9.
With their usual teacher the players defected in 60% of the cases, while with another
person conducting experiment they are doing it in 66%. So, we should not be worried
that our results are driven by the fact that students want to please the teacher and play
as they think they are expected to play.
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Table 4.9: Other teacher treatment marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
defection defection defection defection
other teacher=0 0.591 0.602 0.625 0.602
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
other teacher=1 0.652 0.667 0.647 0.665
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
gender No No Yes Yes
score No Yes No Yes
Observations 45 44 44 44
Standard errors in parentheses
4.4.5 Gender influence
Finally, in Table 4.10 we also look at the marginal effects of gender on the performance
after the course.
Table 4.10: Marginal effects of gender after the Game Theory
(1) (2)
defection defection
female 0.733 0.734
(0.04) (0.04)
male 0.681 0.681
(0.05) (0.05)
score No Yes
Observations 221 221
Standard errors in parentheses
While for both male and female players the probability of defection have risen, the
figure has increased much more for women (from 0.41 to 0.73 for female, and from 0.48
to 0.68 for male). One might think that this can reflect that girls are usually more
diligent students. However, there are no differences in final scores between female and
male students with even boys having slightly higher scores (72.61 for male and 72.19 for
female). We turn to players’ beliefs for the possible explanation of this phenomena. In
one random treatment we’ve elicited players beliefs. In table 4.11 we see the distribution
of beliefs in opponents actions by sex.
We see that remarkably all male players expected their opponents to play cooperatively.
On the contrary, our of 14 female players only 3 expected cooperation, while 11 expected
defection. So, it turns out that man and women have completely different expectations
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Table 4.11: Expectations by gender
N
expect cooperation
female 3
male 9
Total 12
expect defection
female 11
male 0
Total 11
Observations 23
about their opponents in the random treatment - majority (precisely all) of male players
expect their opponent to cooperate, while majority (78%) of female players expect their
opponent to defect. In Table 4.12 we see what actions males and females were actually
choosing for different expectations.
Table 4.12: Outcomes by expectation
males females
expect cooperation
cooperate 6 1
defect 3 2
Total 9 3
expect defection
cooperate 1
defect 10
Total 11
Observations 9 14
As we’ve already seen all male players expect their partners to cooperate. Though we
do not have enough observation to make a strong prediction, we still can see that out of
them 66% choose to cooperate themselves, and 33% choose to defect. On the contrary,
only 3 women out of 14 expected her opponent to cooperate, and only 1 out of these 3
chose to cooperate herself. All the rest female players expected defection with all but
one woman choosing to defect themselves.
So, we see that in random treatment female behavior is affected more by the course
than male behavior. This is largely attributed to differences in expectations between
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men and women in random treatment, with women expecting their opponents to defect
much more often, while men expecting cooperation.
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4.5 Conclusions
In our experiment we have analyzed the effects of learning game theory on students
behavior in a Prisoners Dilemma game. We have seen the substantial changes in overall
performance and have addressed the possible cause of these changes.
Before the course students behave cooperatively mostly because social feelings they had
towards their opponents (like friendship) lead to more optimistic belief about opponents
actions. They were especially cooperative when they knew exactly with whom they were
playing. We have also observed in the treatments where two players in a group were
endowed with different information that players only take into account their private
information and not that of the opponent.
However, after the course players’ behavior became more selfish and they were playing
Nash much more often. After the course participants are less cooperative when playing
with a real person instead of computer. So, the sole fact that opponent himself knows
game theory leads participants to be more selfish (whereas there was only small change
in behavior for those playing against computer). Contrary to what might have been
expected, after the course students defected especially a lot when playing with a known
partner. In the treatments with different information distribution after the course players
took into account both their own information and information of their opponent.
When playing a new game in the treatment with different information distribution be-
tween players, those who were informationally advantaged behave especially cooper-
atively, while those who were informationally disadvantaged behave in a particularly
individualistic manner.
We’ve found substantial gender differences in the way students respond to learning game
theory. Contrary to what have been suggested before, we have found that after the course
when playing with a random partner girls were defecting much more often than boys.
These differences are brought by the differences in their expectations. After the course
in the random treatment majority of female players expected their partner to defect,
while all male players expected cooperation.
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4.6 Appendix
One-way ANOVA test for final score.
Source SS dF MS F Prob>F
Between groups 1637.45349 4 409.363371 3*1.67 3*0.1568
Within groups 100208.39 408 245.608799
Total 101845.844 412 247.19865
For final score
One-was ANOVA test for gender.
Source SS dF MS F Prob>F
Between groups 0.531535986 4 0.132883997 3*0.53 3*0.7111
Within groups 101.599215 408 0.249017683
Total 101.599215 412 0.247890171
For gender
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